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INTRODUCTION

In 1967, Ms. Janet Cooper was employed by Kingsville Independent School District in Texas to teach American History.
Each year thereafter, her contract was renewed. In the fall of
1971, Ms. Cooper employed a simulation exercise to introduce
her students to the characteristics of rural life during the postCivil War Reconstruction era. The role-playing triggered controversy in the classroom and in the community of Kingsville. In
a subsequent consultation with her principal and the district
personnel director, Ms. Cooper was admonished "not to discuss
Blacks" in class and that "nothing controversial should be
discussed in the classroom."1 However, she was not advised to
discontinue the simulation exercise, and thus she completed the
project with her class. In the spring Ms. Cooper was again recommended for reemployment by the principal and superintendent. But contrary to their recommendation, the Board of
Trustees declined to reissue a contract. Court proceedings commenced. School board members testified at the trial that they
disapproved of Ms. Cooper's simulation technique and maintained
that the complaints engendered by its use undermined her effectiveness as a teacher. The district court found for Ms. Cooper,
awarding her $15,000 damages and $4500 attorney fees. Both
parties appealed. On remand, the district court ordered that she
be reinstated as well. Both parties appealed again.
At the second appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the school district's claims that no cause of action existed
under either 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or the Constitution, that no violation of Cooper's constitutional rights had occurred, and that the
court had no power to award attorney fees. In upholding the district court's finding that Ms. Cooper had sustained her prima
facie burden of showing a violation of her constitutional rights,
Kingsville Independent School Dist. v. Cooper, 611 F.2d 1109, 1111 (5th Cir.
1980).
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Judge Godbold for the three-judge panel placed the Fifth Circuit
clearly on the side of academic freedom in the classroom for the
public school teacher: "We thus join the First and Sixth Circuits
in holding that classroom discussion is protected activity."2 He
went on to declare that based on the Fifth Circuit's ruling in
Kaprelian v. Texas Woman's University,3 the proper test to
determine if a teacher has abused the right is "not whether substantial disruption occurs but whether such disruption overbalances the teacher's usefulness as an instructor."4 Here, there
was no evidence that Ms. Cooper's usefulness as a teacher had
been impaired. Indeed, school administrators had recommended
that her contract be renewed. The appeals court affirmed the
trial court's order of reinstatement but remanded the case for a
reevaluation of both back pay and attorney fees.
Three, possibly four, federal circuits have now gone on
record as upholding some degree of academic freedom in the
classroom as a constitutional right for public school teachers.
But the exact contours of the right remained undefined. The differing factual situations in the three cases further muddy the
waters. Not only are teachers in these circuits left with considerable uncertainty about their "right to teach," school administrators also cannot be sure how much authority they have
to control teacher classroom behavior. For example, schools
have traditionally determined the curriculum and controlled the
selection of teaching materials.' Do teachers now have some in2 Id. at 1113.

509 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1975).
611 F.2d at 1113 n.4.
Initial interest in this issue was generated by one of the authors' involvement in a school curriculum implementation project. The authors sought to determine the degree to which teachers could be required to teach specially designed
materials on free enterprise in conformity with a state law. Section 21.1031(a) of
the Texas Education Code requires that "[a]ll public high schools shall give instruction on the essentials and benefits of the free enterprise system. Instruction
shall be given in accordance with the course of study prescribed by the State
Board of Education ....

The State Board of Education shall prescribe suitable

teaching material for the instruction." TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. vol. 2 § 21.1031(a)
(Vernon 1972). Section 21.120, known as the "Economic Education Act of 1977,"
provides in part that the teaching of economic education shall be part of the
grades 1-12 curriculum, and specifies the role of the Central Education Agency.
TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. vol. 2 § 21.120 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1980-1981). The announcement of the Kingsville decision coincided with the authors' preparation of
material and instructional techniques.
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fluence in these areas? To what extent can a teacher deviate
from the school-approved lesson plan in introducing new ideas
and conducting classroom discussion? 6 Under what circumstances can a teacher be disciplined for what he or she expresses in the classroom?
The purpose of this article is to eliminate some of the uncertainty surrounding teacher academic freedom in the public
school classroom by charting its more recent developments and
examining their implications for both teachers and administrators. We will draw extensively from case law, from earlier considerations of this issue,7 and from our own insights as educators. We have limited the scope of our research to the federal
courts.8 We begin with a review of the traditional right of the
' Thus, for example, would a Texas teacher have the right to entertain class
discussion on the negative aspects of the free enterprise system, contrary to the
express wording of the statute? Section 21.120(c) of the Texas Education Code
provides that "[wihile dealing with economic problems and issues, the program
shall teach the positive values of a basically private-enterprise economy ...
TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. vol. 2 § 21.120(c) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1980-1981).
See generally Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right of Public
School Teachers to Determine What They Teach, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1293 (1976);
Miller, Teachers' Freedom of Expression Within the Classroom: A Search for
Standards, 8 GA. L. REv. 837 (1974); Nahmod, Controversy in the Classroom: The
High School Teacher and Freedom of Expression, 39 Gao. WASH. L. REV. 1032
(1971); Nahmod, First Amendment Protectionfor Learning and Teaching: The
Scope of JudicialReview, 18 WAYNE L. REv. 1479 (1972); Van Alstyne, The Constitutional Rights of Teachers and Professors, 1970 DuKE L. REV. 841 (1970);
Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1045 (1968);
Note, Academic Freedom in the Public Schools: The Right to Teach, 48 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1176 (1973); Comment, Academic Freedom in the High School Classroom, 15
J. FAM. L. 706 (1977).
It is important, however, to note that state law can have an important role
in determining the civil rights of teachers in the school. For example, in the state
of Washington, the Washington Supreme Court recently decided that school
districts in the state can require conformity in teaching methodology despite
teacher allegations that doing so violates their classroom academic freedom
rights. Millikan v. Board of Directors, 93 Wash. 2d 522, 611 P.2d 414 (1980).
Millikan involved two high school teachers whose team-teaching assignment for
an innovative history course was altered when enrollment shifted. One of the
teachers alleged that his transfer to the science laboratory was in retaliation for
his joining his team colleague in filing a grievance over the way the school was
registering students in history courses. The Washington Supreme Court refused
to recognize the teachers' claim to a constitutional right to select teaching
methods and materials, distinguishing relevant federal court decisions. However,
the court did note that "teachers should have some measure of freedom in
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state to control the school curriculum. 9
II.

A.

STATE CONTROL OVER CURRICULUM

State Agencies and the Right to Establish Curriculum

The tenth amendment to the Constitution reserves all
powers not specifically delegated to the federal government to
the individual states. Hence, a state legislature possesses
plenary power over public education systems within its borders. 10
Customarily, the state legislature establishes the structure of
public education and delegates to state agencies and local institutions the authority to operate schools." Most of the responsibility, therefore, for day-to-day school management falls upon
local school boards. And, consequently, local school administrators have considerable authority with respect to particular curriculum matters.
teaching techniques employed," although not to the extent of ignoring or omitting
"essential course material or ... the course calendar." Id. at 529, 611 P.2d at 417.
Insofar as the reassignment to the science lab was concerned, the court concluded
that the facts did not bear out the teacher's contention of retaliation for his filing
of a grievance.
The case law, of course, can also go the other way. Increasingly, plaintiffs
are looking to state constitutions for protection of their rights. A case in point is
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). In Pruneyard, the
United States Supreme Court ruled unanimously that states may use their own
state constitutional provisions to grant persons broad access and free speech
rights at privately-owned establishments. The California Supreme Court had held
that the California Constitution protects speech and petitioning in shopping
centers, even if privately owned. Justice Rehnquist for the Court noted that "Our
reasoning in Lloyd v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) . . . does not .

.

. limit the

authority of the State to exercise its police power or its sovereign right to adopt
in its own Constitution individual liberties more expansive than those conferred
by the Federal Constitution." Id. at 2040. In the education context, state constitutions have provided the legal means found wanting in San Antonio v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1 (1973), to equalize school finance. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d
584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971); Horton v. Meskill, 31 Conn. 377, 332
A.2d 113 (1974); Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973). Of course,
given the traditional power the state has exercised over the curriculum, it seems
unlikely that state law will become a major source for teacher classroom academic
freedom rights.
9 For the purpose of this article, "curriculum" will be defined as a course of
study occurring within a classroom at a designated time.
10Project, Educationand the Law: State Interests and IndividualRights, 74
MICH. L.. REV. 1373, 1380 (1976).
" Id. at 1380-81.
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On numerous occasions, judges have reaffirmed the legitimate authority of the state and the school board to implement
and enforce curriculum policy. For example, in Epperson v.
Arkansas," the Supreme Court struck down an Arkansas statute
forbidding the teaching of evolution in the public schools because of its conflict with the Establishment Clause of the first
amendment. But at the same time, the Court acknowledged that
"[bly and large, public education in our Nation is committed to
the control of state and local authorities." 3 In 1974, the Supreme
Court affirmed without opinion a district court decision upholding the right of the state to prohibit discussion of birth control
in public schools."4 In the course of its opinion, the district court
observed that "[t]he State may establish its curriculum either by
law or by delegation of its authority to the local school boards
and communities."'is
These recent rulings reinforce the traditional view that the
state has the right to control the public school curriculum and to
delegate this function to local school boards.'" The controlling rationale relates to the historic role of public schools in American
society. Acting parenspatriae, states established public schools
in part to teach skills and in part to socialize children to the
American way of life.' Courts have long recognized the important relationship between the school curriculum and community
values. Several recent decisions are illustrative. In Mercer v.
Michigan State Board of Education,8 the district court observed
that the fact that the state delegates its curricular authority to
the local school board
12

393 U.S. 97 (1968).

Id. at 104.
Mercer v. State, 379 F. Supp. 580 (E.D. Mich.), affd mem., 419 U.S. 1081
(1974). Justices Douglas, Brennan and White noted probable jurisdiction and
would have set the case for oral argument.
379 F. Supp. at 585.
IS See also Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1305
's

(7th Cir. 1980) ("virtually every judicial body that has commented on the matter
has acknowledged the need for broad discretionary powers in local school
boards."); Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd., 457 F.2d 289 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972) (school board has power to determine access
to books in library); Palmer v. Board of Educ., 466 F. Supp. 600 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd,
603 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 689 (1980) (school board had
"undoubted right" to regulate its curriculum).
17 See, e.g., R. DAWSON & K. PREWITT, POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION 147 (1969).
" 379 F. Supp. 580 (E.D. Mich.), affd mem., 419 U.S. 1081 (1974).
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is a long recognized system of operation in our Nation.... This
is in part a deference to local control which is a recognition of
the varying wants and needs of the Nation's diverse and varied
communities, each with its own character, standards, and sense
of social importance of a variety of values."9
20
In Cary v. Board of Education,
which involved a school
district's decision not to accept all textbooks recommended for
an elective course by a delegation of high school English
teachers, Judge Logan commented that "[ilt is legitimate for the
curriculum of the school district to reflect the value system and
educational emphasis which are the collective will of those
whose children are being educated and who are paying the
costs. 2 1 In Palmer v. Board of Education,' a federal district
court upheld the dismissal of a public school teacher for refusing
to carry out her responsibilities in the classroom. In the course
of its opinion, the district court noted that "[s]tates acting
through local school boards are possessed of power to 'inculcate
basic community values. . . .'"" And in upholding the right of
school officials to remove books from the curriculum and library,
the Seventh Circuit has said that "it is in general permissible
and appropriate for local boards to make educational decisions
"124
based upon their personal, social, political and moral views.

B.

The Right of School Officials to Require Teachers to
Follow the Curriculum

As a necessary corollary to the school board's power to control the curriculum, school officials have generally been accorded

19Id. at 585.

0 427 F. Supp. 945 (D. Col. 1977), affd on other grounds, 598 F.2d 535 (10th
Cir. 1979).
21 598 F.2d at 543.
22 466 F. Supp. 600 (N.D. Ill.), affd, 603 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
100 S. Ct. 689 (1980).
1 466 F. Supp. at 602-03.
24 Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1305 (7th Cir.
1980). See also, Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Bd., 475 F. Supp. 615 (D.
Vt. 1979), affd, 638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980) (no constitutional violation for school
board members to use their own standards of taste about vulgarity in removing
books from the library); Cf. Pico v. Board of Educ., 474 F. Supp. 387 (E.D.N.Y.
1979), rev'd and rem'd, 638 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.granted,50 U.S.L.W. 3265
(U.S. Oct. 13, 1981).
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substantial control over teacher classroom behavior. The primary rationale is that the teacher as an employee must carry
out the directives of the employer. If the teacher deviates from
the lesson plan, then the power of the state and local school
board over the curriculum is thwarted. Justice Black probably
stated the proposition in its bluntest form in his dissent in the
landmark student rights case, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District: "[tjeachers in the state controlled public
schools are hired to teach there .... [C]ertainly a teacher is not
paid to go into school and teach subjects the State does not hire
him to teach as part of its selected curriculum."25
In the Michigan case involving a state law prohibiting the
discussion of birth control in the public schools, the district
court asserted that "[t]here is nothing in the first amendment
that gives a person employed to teach the Constitutional right
to teach beyond the scope of the established curriculum."" A recent relevant district court decision recognizes the right of
school authorities to terminate a kindergarten teacher for noncompliance with the school curriculum even though she attributed her behavior to her observance of the Jehovah's Witness
faith.' The district court judge noted that "refusal to conform
classroom teaching to a prescribed curriculum is not protected."2
393 U.S. 503, 522 (1969).
Mercer v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 379 F. Supp. 580, 585 (E.D. Mich.),
affd mem., 419 U.S. 1081 (1974).
1 Palmer v. Board of Educ., 466 F. Supp. 600 (N.D. Ill.), affd, 603 F.2d 1271
(7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 689 (1980).
1 Id. at 604. For additional discussion of employer-employee relationship, see
Drown v. Portsmouth School Dist., 451 F.2d 1106 (1st Cir. 1971) (nonrenewal of a
teacher for being too innovative and unconventional would be proper under the
wide discretion given school boards); Ahern v. Board of Educ., 327 F. Supp. 1391
(D. Neb. 1971), affd, 456 F.2d 399 (8th Cir. 1972) (teacher had no right to persist in
a course of teaching behavior which contravened the valid dictates of her
employers and the public school board regarding classroom method); Nigosian v.
Weiss, 343 F. Supp. 757 (E.D. Mich. 1971) (no infringement on constitutional rights
of teacher who was discharged for allowing classroom discussion of labor dispute
without permission). But see Hall v. Board of School Comm'rs, 496 F. Supp. 697
(S.D. Ala. 1980) (school board policies which restrict teachers in distributing
literature and communicating about employment matters on campus must be narrowly drawn and must provide a right of appeal), and Substitutes United for Bet1980) (school board may not proter Schools v. Rohter, 496 F. Supp. 1017 (N.D. Ill.
hibit teachers from selling a newspaper which disseminated the views of an
organization to which they belong on school grounds).
25
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State Control Weakens with Student Age

While the state has traditionally been accorded substantial
control over the school curriculum and over teacher classroom
behavior, courts have recognized that the age of the students involved may have a direct bearing on the extent of state influence. As the child grows older, his interest in having an unfettered opportunity to explore ideas and gain knowledge broadens.
An oft-cited case is Keyishian v. Board of Regents,9 a 5-to-4 decision striking down the New York teacher loyalty law. In dictum,
Justice Brennan for the majority asserted that
[o]ur Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely
to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special
concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws
that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.'
He recited a litany of cases in support of classroom freedom, including Sweezy v. New Hampshire where the Court asserted
that "[t]eachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die."'"
These cases, however, involve postsecondary education.
Courts have found themselves in a quandary when drawing an
analogy to the public school teacher. Precedent supporting the
role of the public school in inculcating community values is abundant. Yet, should the state have extensive authority at all grade
levels? While there are striking differences in the character of
secondary education as compared with collegiate," the age and
385 U.S. 589 (1967).
SR.at 603.
, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
The district court in Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Mass.), affd,
448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971) (per curiam) offered this contrast:
The secondary school more clearly than the college or university acts in
loco parentis with respect to minors. It is closely governed by a school
board selected by a local community. The faculty does not have independent traditions, the broad discretion as to teaching methods, nor usually
the intellectual qualifications, of university professor[s]. Among secondary school teachers, there are often many persons with little experience. Some teachers and most students have limited intellectual and
emotional maturity. Most parents, students, school boards and members of the community usually expect the secondary school to concen-
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maturity differences between upper level high school students
and lower level college students are less obvious. 3
trate on transmitting basic information, teaching 'the best that is
known and thought in the world,' training by established techniques,
and, to some extent at least, indoctrinating in the mores of the surrounding society. While secondary schools are not rigid disciplinary institutions, neither are they open forums in which mature adults, already
habituated to social restraints, exchange ideas on a level of parity.
Moreover, it cannot be accepted as a premise that the student is voluntarily in the classroom and willing to be exposed to a teaching method
which, though reasonable, is not approved by the school authorities or
by the weight of professional opinion. A secondary school student,
unlike most college students, is usually required to attend school classes
and may have no choice as to his teacher.
323 F. Supp. at 1392.
The findings of leading early childhood researchers indicate that the
maturity levels of high school students are not much different from adults. According to Piaget, the highest level of moral development reached by most individuals is achieved in early adolescence. PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE
CHILD (1979). Between the ages of 11-14, an individual develops the mental operations for adult thinking. The child can think and reason in abstract terms, consider alternatives, and form hypotheses. The child at this age can imagine the
possible consequences of an act. These intellectual abilities allow an individual to
think objectively about moral situations. He can be flexible in interpreting and
generalizing about rules. Kohlberg similarly views the adolescent as capable of
making independent moral judgments. L. KOHLBERG, STAGES IN THE DEVELOPMENT
OF MORAL THOUGHT AND ACTION (1969). For a general discussion of research, see
BIEHLER, CHILD DEVELOPMENT: AN INTRODUCTION (1976); BROPHY, CHILD DEVELOP.
MENT AND SOCIALIZATION (1977); SMART, CHILDREN: DEVELOPMENT AND RELATIONSHIPS (1979). Compare the views of Piaget and Kohlberg with those of the court in
Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1304 (7th Cir. 1980). "A
high school student's lack of the intellectual skills necessary for taking full advantage of the marketplace of ideas engenders a corresponding need for direction
and guidance from those better equipped by experience and reflection to make
critical choices." Note also the district court's assertion in Mailloux that "[s]ome
teachers and most students have limited intellectual and emotional maturity." 323
F. Supp. at 1392.
In the recent decision striking down a Massachusetts statute as overly
restrictive of the rights of minors to secure abortions, Justice Powell acknowledged
the inevitable arbitrary nature of age-of-majority determinations. "[T]he ...problem of determining 'maturity' makes clear why the State generally may resort to
objective, though inevitably arbitrary, criteria such as age limits, marital status,
or membership in the armed forces for lifting some or all of the legal disabilities
of minority." Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643 n.23 (1979). The fact that the state
continues through compulsory school laws and curriculum requirements to
restrain the freedom of many mature young people suggests that more, not less,
classroom freedom may be warranted for these students. Indeed, if, as Chief
Justice Burger has asserted, a prime rational for compulsory high school educa-
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The conception of an age-activated sliding scale for determining the permissible extent of state authority over curriculum in the elementary-secondary sector has yet to receive extensive judicial support. However, the use of student age as a
criterion does appear to be gaining ground. The earliest case is
Keefe v. Geanakos,4 which involved the dismissal of a teacher
who assigned an essay containing the term "motherfucker" to
his senior English class. In siding with the teacher, the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit observed that if
"the students must be protected from such exposure [to the
term], we would fear for their future." 5 The court did agree that
"what is to be said or read to students is not to be determined
by obscenity standards for adult comsumption," citing Ginsberg
tion requirements is "to prohibit most child labor," the argument for assuring an
open classroom environment similar to that enjoyed by first-year college students
becomes even stronger. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 228 (1972).
Insofar as the school social environment is concerned, many educators now
endorse the "stair-stepping" approach to student rights advocated by the late Edward T. Ladd. "[W]e should classify students into groups corresponding roughly
to the progress they should have made and should now be making in freeing
themselves from adult direction ...." Ladd, Civil Libertiesfor Students-At
What Age?, 3 J. L. and EDUC. 255, (1974). Thus, the rights of older high school
students are more extensive than those of junior high students, and the latter, in
turn, have more freedom than elementary children. Absent any clear differences
in the maturity levels of high school juniors/seniors and lower division college
students, the Ladd thesis seems to apply with equal force to the classroom setting. Indeed, the Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education recently
issued a report critical of the "big monolithic high school and its deadly weekly
routine," and advocated earlier entry into college, as well as the combination of
the last two years of high school with collge. CARNEGIE COUNCIL ON POLICY
STUDIES IN HIGHER EDUC., GIVING YOUTH A BETTER CHANCE: OPTIONS FOR EDUCA-

TION, WORK, SERVICE (1979). See also Whitlock, Don't Hold Them Back, in COI
LEGE ENTRANCE EXAMINATION BOARD (1978), and 16-20: The Liberal Education of
an Age Group, in COLLEGE ENTRANCE EXAMINATION BOARD, 1970.

305 F. Supp. 1091 (D. Mass.), rev'd, 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969).
418 F.2d at 361. A district court in the First Circuit quoted this passage in
a recent decision ordering a school board to replace a controversial book removed
from the library. Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp.
703 (D. Mass. 1978). While the court observed that the street language of a poem
contained in the book might offend some, it nevertheless agreed that the words
communicate ideas. "The author is writing about her perception of city life in
rough but relevant language that gives credibility to the development of a sensitive theme." Id. at 714. The court noted that though the students involved were
younger than those affected in Keefe, "defendants produced no credible evidence
that the age difference was consequential." Id. at 714, n.17.
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v. New York 8 The appeals court also took note of the fact that
five books in the school library contained the same word. "Such
inconsistency on the part of the school has been regarded as
37
fatal."
The First Circuit again confronted the age question in a
1971 case, Mailloux v. Kiley, 38 involving a teacher's discussion of
the word "fuck" in a high school classroom. The district court
discussed the implications of the particular situation with respect to the age of the students, finding that eleventh grade
students "have a sophistication sufficient to treat the word from
a serious educational viewpoint." 39 However, the court recognized
that secondary schools "are [not] open forums in which matute
adults, already habituated to social restraints, exchange ideas
on a level of parity."4 In affirming the decision that the teacher
could not be dismissed under the circumstances of this case, the
First Circuit acknowledged that "free speech does not grant
teachers a license to say or write in class whatever they may
feel like," and that the propriety of regulations or sanctions
"must depend on such circumstances as the age and sophistication of the students. . . .'," The circuit court expressed doubt
that workable guidelines could be developed for weighing such
circumstances as the age and sophistication of the students: "At
present we see no substitute for a case-by-case inquiry into
whether the legitimate interests of the authorities are demonstrably sufficient to circumscribe a teacher's speech." 2
In Webb v. Lake Mills Community Schools District,3 an
Iowa federal district court ruled in favor of the plaintiff in a
dispute over the high school drama coach's choice of two plays
found objectionable due to the presence of certain terms ("son of
a bitch" and "damn"). In deciding for the plaintiff, the court
noted that "[allthough Keyishian is concerned with college
teachers, the rationale must extend to high school and even
elementary teachers. The state interest in limiting the discre390 U.S. 629 (1968).
418 F.2d at 362.
323 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 448 F.2d 1242 (lst Cir. 1971).
323 F. Supp. at 1389.
40 Id. at 1392.
41 448 F.2d at 1243.
42Id

344 F. Supp. 791 (N. D. Iowa 1972).
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tion of teachers grows stronger, though, as the age of the
students decreases.... "944
Explicitly asserting that students have a constitutional
"right to hear," the federal district court in Wilson v. Chancellor45 struck down a school board ban on political speakers. In
" Id. at 799. A district court in Connecticut was unsympathetic to the free
speech claims of a dismissed teacher in Burns v. Rovaldi, 477 F. Supp. 270 (D.
Conn. 1979), in part because of the relative youth of his students. The teacher had
initiated a pen-pal program, whereby his fifth grade students practiced their penmanship by writing a letter to his fiancee. She in turn wrote to each of them, informing them that she was a communist like their teacher and telling them that
"[wle are both working hard for the day when you kids and the rest of us working
people kick out all the rich rotten bosses and then we can all run everything
ourselves." The school board ordered Burns' dismissal on the basis of his violating
a by-law against partisan instruction in the school. In upholding the dismissal, the
court commented that "[elven a most expansive concept of 'a market-place of
ideas' would not be extended to include a class of fifth graders among those with
whom to discuss what is wrong with the world and how it can be put right." Id. at
276. The court concluded that:
The bald facts are that the plaintiff used the school time of the students
to arbitrarily indoctrinate them in concepts having nothing whatever to
do with skill or knowledge of penmanship. Only in bad faith can one
refuse to recognize the difference between impartial and undogmatic instruction and advocacy of a partisan political doctrine together with the
rejection of everything opposed to it.
Id. at 277 (emphasis in original).
,1418 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Or. 1976). The court briefly reviewed the roots of the
"right to hear/know" rationale, citing cases involving the denial to prisoners of access to periodicals, cases involving members of a potential audience for a speaker
prohibited from speaking, and cases related to the public's "right to know." Of
these, the court concluded that only the potential audience cases applied, and
cited Vail v. Board of Educ., 354 F. Supp. 512 (D.N.H. 1973); Brooks v. Auburn
Univ., 290 F. Supp. 188 (M.D. Ala.), affd, 412 F.2d 1191 (5th Cir. 1969); Smith v.
University of Tenn., 300 F. Supp. 777 (E.D. Tenn. 1969). Cf. Moore v. School Bd.,
364 F. Supp. 355, 360 (N.D. Fla. 1973) ("[t]enth [g]rade [b]iology students have the
right and freedom not to listen and as a captive audience should be able to expect
protection from improper classroom activities."). See also Close v. Lederle, 303 F.
Supp. 1109 (D. Mass. 1969), rev'd, 424 F.2d 988 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 903
(1970). More recently, courts have found a right to hear/know in the context of the
school library. See, e.g., Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 384 F. Supp.
698 (N.D. Ohio 1974), aff'd in part, 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976), where the appeals
court cited several United States Supreme Court cases to support "both the First
Amendment right to know ... and the standing of the student plaintiffs to raise
the issue." 541 F.2d at 583. The court ordered the books replaced. Cf. Zykan v.
Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980). See note 47 infra.
In Zykan, the Seventh Circuit agreed that "[s]econdary school students certainly
retain an interest in some freedom of the classroom, if only through the qualified
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the course of its opinion, the court observed that "today's high
school students are surprisingly sophisticated, intelligent, and
discerning. "46 Widespread endorsement of a constitutional right
to hear or know for high school students in the classroom setting would clearly challenge traditional school board control of
what goes on in high school classrooms. To date, however, the
"right to know" rationale has made little headway in the secondary school classroom context.
Finally, the age issue has surfaced in a slightly different
first amendment context, that of censorship of student news'freedom to hear' that has emerged as a constitutional concept" (citing Virginia
Pharmacy Brd. v. Virginia Citizen's Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976)), but
concluded that the age of the students and the traditional curricular control of
school board overbalanced the constitutional argument. The student-appellants
were protesting the school board's decision to terminate an innovative English
program including a "Woman in Literature" course and to exclude the books from
the curriculum. The students argued that the action infringed upon their "right to
hear" and "right to know," as well as chilled teacher academic freedom, and was
based only on the personal belief systems of the school board members. The case
was remanded to see if the plaintiffs could "amend their complaint ... to allege
the kind of interference with secondary school academic freedom that has been
found to be cognizable as a constitutional claim." 631 F.2d at 1309. One commentator noted that if the students had succeeded in convincing the court, "virtually
every decision made by a school board would be subject to reversal by the federal
courts." Flygare, The Zykan Case: A Triumph for School BoardAuthority, 62 PHI
DELTA KAPPAN 279, (December, 1980). For a detailed discussion of the student's
right to know issue, see Comment, School Library Censorship:FirstAmendment
Guarantees and the Student's Right to Know, 57 U. DET. J. URB. L. 523 (1980).
See also Niccolai, The Right to Read and School Library Censorship, 10 J. L. AND
EDuc. 23 (1981).
" 418 F. Supp. at 1368. Cf. the Seventh Circuit's more condescending view of
high school students as expressed in Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp.,
631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980):
[T]wo factors tend to limit the relevance of 'academic freedom' at the
secondary school level. First, the student's right to and need for such
freedom is bounded by the level of his or her intellectual development.
A high school student's lack of the intellectual skills necessary for taking full advantage of the marketplace of ideas engenders a correspondingly greater need for direction and guidance from those better equipped
by experience and reflection to make critical educational choices. Second, the importance of secondary schools in the development of intellectual faculties is only one part of a broad formative role encompassing
the encouragement and nurturing of those fundamental social, political,
and moral values that will permit a student to take his place in the community.
Id. at 1304. Contrast the court's view of the intellectual maturity of high school
students with the views of leading childhood researchers. Note 33 supra.
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7
There, stupapers. The leading case is Trachtman v. Anker.1
dent newspaper editors sought to distribute a sex questionaire
to fellow high school students and print the results in the newspaper. School officials prevented distribution, citing in part
potential psychological harm to some students. The district
court agreed younger students who are in the process of
developing sexual identities could suffer harm. The court identified "younger students" as being 13 and 14 years of age and
upheld the ban as applied to them. However, the court felt high
school juniors and seniors were sufficiently mature, given their
existence in New York City, to answer the questionnaire. The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the ruling, concluding in a 2-to-1 decision that school officials had sufficient
grounds for believing psychological harm could accrue to older
as well as younger students. Both the district court decision and
Circuit Judge Mansfield's lengthy dissent in which he advocated
allowing all students to complete the questionnaire are reflective of growing judicial cognizance of the relationship between
age/maturity and student entitlement to constitutional rights.

To summarize this section, there continues to be extensive
judicial support for the state, acting either centrally or through
local school boards, to determine the curriculum and regulate
the behavior of the classroom teacher. However, some courts acknowledge that as the age of students increases, the extent of
state curricular control decreases. Thus, rather than a sharp demarcation line between the "closed" classroom of the high school
and the "open" classroom of the college, a gradualist approach
emerges whereby older students have more freedom of inquiry
than younger students. The states' control of the curriculum and
teacher behavior declines commensurately. The next section examines more closely the claims of teachers to a "right to teach."
III.
A.

THE TEACHER'S ASSERTED RIGHT To TEACH

An Overview of Academic Freedom

Historically, teachers have justified their quest for curriculum control through the philosophy of academic freedom. Aca' 426 F. Supp. 198 (S.D. N.Y. 1976), rev'd, 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978). For an in-depth discussion of this case and the school
district's argument that it has a duty to protect the interests of younger students,
see Diamond, Interference with the Rights of Others: Authority to Restrict
Students' FirstAmendment Rights 8 J. L. AND EDUC. 347 (1979).
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demic freedom originated from the nineteenth century German
concepts of lehrfreiheit and lernfreiheit implying the teacher's
8
freedom to teach and the student's freedom to learn. Virtually
unlimited freedom and discretionary powers were awarded
European university professors.
Much of the controversy over the nature and extent of
academic freedom in the United States relates to the fact that it
is not specifically mentioned in the Constitution. Nonetheless,
the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) has
ardently and continuously claimed the principle for the collegiate teaching profession. 9 Academic freedom can be sepa" "Although some aspects of intellectual freedom embodied in the concept of
academic freedom find their sources in antiquity, the modern development of the
doctrine of academic freedom is derived largely from the nineteenth century German concepts of lehrfreiheit and lernfreiheit-freedom of teaching and learning.
The basic concepts were that a university faculty member was free to teach what
and how he thought best, and a student was free to learn what and how he
thought best, with university authorities or external agencies, such as government, imposing only the most minimal restraints on either teacher or student."
Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right of Public School Teachers to
Determine What They Teach, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1299 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Goldstein].
,9 The AAUP issued a statement in support of academic freedom at its founding in 1915. The current AAUP policy tracks that of the earlier statement and can
be found in AAUP, POLICY DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS 2 (1977). The current policy

reads:
a. The teacher is entitled to full freedom in research and in the
publication of the results, subject to the adequate performance of his
other academic duties; but research for pecuniary return should be based
upon an understanding with the authorities of the institution.
b. The teacher is entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing his subject, but he should be careful not to introduce into his teaching controversial matter which has no relation to his subject. Limitations
of academic freedom because of religious or other aims of the institution
should be clearly stated in writing at the time of the appointment.
c. The college or university teacher is a citizen, a member of a
learned profession, and an officer of an educational institution. When he
speaks or writes as a citizen, he should be free from institutional censorship or discipline, but his special position in the community imposes
special obligations. As a man of learning and an educational officer he
should remember that the public may judge his profession and his institution by his utterances. Hence he should at all time be accurate,
should exercise appropriate restraint, should show respect for the opinions of others, and should make every effort to indicate that he is not an
institutional spokesman.
For an extended discussion of academic freedom, see generally THE CONCEPT
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rated into three categories: the freedom of association beyond
the academic environment, the freedom of expression outside
the classroom, and the freedom to control class discussion and to
select appropriate teaching methods.
B.

Academic Freedom: Freedom of Association

The first and fourteenth amendments have been construed
to guarantee the public school teacher and college professor a
freedom of association outside the academic environment. Two
United States Supreme Court decisions strongly support this
0
aspect of academic freedom. In Shelton v. Tucker,"
the Supreme
requiring
teachers to
Court struck down an Arkansas statute
file affidavits listing membership in organizations for the
previous five years. In a brief but potent majority opinion,
Justice Stewart wrote that "[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of
American Schools.""1 He concluded that "[t]he statute's comprehensive interference with associational freedom goes far
beyond what might be justified in the exercise of the State's
legitimate inquiry into the fitness and competency of its
teachers."52
In Keyishian v. Board of Regents,' the Supreme Court ruled
that loyalty oaths required of faculty members at the State University of New York unconstitutionally denied teachers' association rights. Justice Brennan stated:

OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM (E. Pincoffs ed. 1975). For a legal discussion, see W.
KAPLAN, THE LAW OF HIGHER EDUCATION (1978) (supp. 1980), and H. EDWARDS &
V. NORDIN, HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE LAW (1979) (supp. 1980). For a discussion
of the relationship between academic freedom and academic tenure in higher
education, see FACULTY TENURE: A REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION (1973).
364 U.S. 479 (1960).
s' Id. at 487.
Id. at 490.
Citing Shelton, the Seventh Circuit declared in McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398
F.2d 287, 288 (1968), that since "it is settled that teachers have the right to free
association," they have a right to join unions. "Unless there is some illegal intent,
an individual's right to form and join a union is protected by the First Amendment." Id at 289. The court went on to note that "even if this record disclosed
that the union was connected with unlawful activity, the bare fact of membership
does not justify charging members with their organization's misdeeds." Id.
w 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
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Our nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendant value to all of us and not merely
to teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that
cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. '
C.

Academic Freedom: Right to Expression Outside of Class

The second classification of academic freedom establishes
the right to expression outside of the classroom. The doctrinal
case is Pickering v. Board of Education.5 Justice Marshall,
writing for a unanimous Court, recognized that
the State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech
of its employees ....
The problem ... is to arrive at a balance
between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting
upon matters of public concern and the interest of the state, as
an employer, in prompting the efficiency of the public services
it performs through its employees. '
Thus, outside comments are acceptable if not made recklessly or
with knowledge of their falsity and do not impede school operations.
Two other recent United States Supreme Court decisions involving teacher rights of expression should be briefly noted
here. The first, Mt. Healthy v. Doyle," involved a teacher who,
in addition to other incidents occurring within the school, made
comments critical of the school over a local radio station. The
Court held that while a teacher cannot be denied reemployment
for the legitimate exercise of constitutional rights, the teacher

I, Id at 603.

However, in Knight v. Board of Regents, 390 U.S. 36 (1968), aff'g mem., 269
F. Supp. 339 (S.D. N.Y. 1967), the Court affirmed a lower court ruling upholding a
provision of the New York Education Law requiring public and private school
teachers and professors to swear allegiance to the state constitution and United
States Constitution. In 1971, the Court relied on the Knight opinion as precedent
in unanimously approving part of a similar Florida statute. Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971). The Court, however, struck down a portion of the
oath requiring the signer to pledge that he does not believe in overthrow of the
government by force or violence since the provision did not provide for notice and
a hearing prior to dismissal.
391 U.S. 563 (1968).
5' I& at 568.
5' 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
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has the burden of proving that the action taken against him
stemmed primarily from the exercise of the right. In the words
of Justice Rehnquist, who spoke for the Court:
A border line or marginal candidate should not have the employment question resolved against him because of constitutionally protected conduct. But that same candidate ought not to be
able, by engaging in such conduct, to prevent his employer from
assessing his performance record and reaching a decision not to
rehire on the basis of that record, simply because the protected
conduct makes the employer more certain of the correctness of
its decision.5
The second decision, Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated
9
School District,;
involved private communication between a
public school teacher and a school principal. In a unanimous reversal of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court
ruled that a private, as well as public, expression is protected by
the first amendment in the context of public employment. Justice Rehnquist stated for the Court that, "[t]he First Amendment forbids abridgement of the 'freedom of speech.' Neither
the Amendment itself nor our decisions indicate that this
freedom is lost to the public employee who arranges to communicate privately with his employer rather than to spread his
views before the public."6
Nevertheless, the Court repeated the caveat expressed in
Pickering that a teacher does not have an absolute right to free
expression. If the expression is recklessly made, impedes the
performance of the teacher's duties, or interferes with school
functioning, the expression loses its protection, and action may
be taken against the teacher. The Court added that since subordinate-superior relations are particularly sensitive, the content
of what is said in private expression, as well as the time, place,
and manner in which it is said, can be taken into account in
deciding what is and what is not constitutionally protected. The
Court remanded the Givhan case to determine if the decision not
to reappoint would have been made even if the protected encounters with the school principal had never occurred.

Id. at 286.
439 U.S. 410 (1979).
Id. at 415-16.
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Taken together these three cases provide the public school
teacher with some degree of constitutional protection for the exercise of rights of expression. However, they neither accord the
teacher academic freedom in the classroom nor carte blanche in
criticizing superiors. Furthermore, they place the burden on the
teacher to prove that the legitimate exercise of a constitutional
right was a substantial factor in whatever sanctions are imposed.
Once this is proven, the school then must show that, even if the
protected communication had never occurred, the same action
would have been taken against the teacher. 1
D.

Academic Freedom: Applied to the Classroom Setting

The third classification of academic freedom relates to control of classroom methodology and discussion. The principles of
the AAUP do not endorse unlimited rights in this area. "The
teacher is entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing his
subject, but he should be careful not to introduce into his
teaching controversial matter which has no relation to his subject."
recent cases using the Mt. Healthy test and decided in favor of the
teacher, see Brown v. Bullard Independent School Dist., 640 F.2d 651 (5th Cir.
1981); Lemons v. Morgan, 629 F.2d 1389 (8th Cir. 1980), Columbus Educ. Ass'n v.
Columbus City School Dist., 263 F.2d 1155 (6th Cir. 1980); Hickman v. Valley
Local School Dist., 619 F.2d 606 (6th Cir. 1980); Zoll v. Eastern Allamakee Community School Dist., 588 F.2d 246 (8th Cir. 1978); Greminger v. Seaborne, 584 F.2d
275 (8th Cir. 1978); Bernasconi v. Tempe Elementary School Dist., 548 F.2d 857
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977); Niederhuber v. Camden City Vocational & Technical School Dist., 495 F. Supp. 273 (D.N.J. 1980); Dean v. Timpson
Independent School Dist., 486 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Tex. 1979).
62AAUP, POLICY DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS, supra note 49. One commentator
long associated with the AAUP has written in an often quoted article that:
As individuals, we have our viewpoints on political and social issues of
our times. As professors, in that role, we do not. Our only commitment
is to academic freedom and autonomy within the university because
these are the indispensable conditions for our work for learning and the
pursuit of truth. This is the posture of neutrality which affords us to
claim just entitlement to public and governmental support regardless of
what political views are at any moment in the ascendancy, and which
gives us and our students protection as individuals against official
pressures toward uniformity and orthodoxy. Once we ourselves break
this neutrality by using the university itself and our roles as professors
within it to advance political judgments we hold personally, we forfeit
the strongest moral link in the chain of our defenses.
Kadish, The Strike and the Professorship,54 AAUP BULL. 160 (1968).
61 For
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While the widely-endorsed principles of the AAUP have furnished college professors at public institutions with considerable
academic freedom in the classroom, they have not equally benefitted the public school teacher. In asserting that they, too,
should have a "right to teach," public school teachers advance
essentially two arguments. They argue first, that the teacher
has an obligation to see that the classroom is truly a "marketplace of ideas" in line with previous Supreme Court decisions
supporting this idea, and second, that public school teachers as
professionals are entitled to the same professional prerogatives
in the classroom as their college and university counterparts.
This section reviews each in turn.
The marketplace of ideas theory is in direct contrast to the
philosophy that the schools are to devote their energies to the
inculcation of community values. Advocates of classroom academic freedom for teachers perceive the teacher as responsible
for seeing that the classroom presents a marketplace of ideas.
They take their cue from several United States Supreme Court
63
decisions, including Wieman v. Updegraff,
Sweezy v. New
Hampshire," Shelton v. Tucker" and Keyishian v. Board of
Regents."s Each case talks about the value of an open classroom
environment. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Wieman, recognized the relevance of an open classroom environment to the development of the students' critical thinking and openmindedness.
To regard teachers-in our entire educational system, from the
primary grades to the university-as the priests of our democracy is therefore not to indulge in hyperbole. It is the special
task of teachers to foster those habits of open-mindedness and
critical inquiry which alone make for responsible citizens, who,
in turn, make possible an enlightened and effective public opinion. Teachers must fulfill their function by precept and practice,
by the very atmosphere which they generate; they must be exemplars of open-mindedness and free inquiry. They cannot
carry out their noble task if the conditions for the practice of a
responsible and critical mind are denied to them. They must
have the freedom of responsible inquiry, by thought and action,
344 U.S.
354 U.S.
364 U.S.
385 U.S.

183
234
479
589

(1952).
(1957).
(1960).
(1967).
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into the meaning of social and economic ideas, into the
checkered history of social and economic dogma. 7
In Sweezy, the Court asserted that "[t]eachers and students
must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to
gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise, our civilization will stagnate and die."68 In Shelton, Justice Stewart wrote
that "[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is
nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools."69
And in Keyishian, Justice Brennan asserted that "[tjhe classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.' "70
While none of these cases directly involved public school
teacher classroom freedom, 1 teacher groups have drawn upon
them in support of the assertion that it is their unique responsibility to see that the classroom is a marketplace of ideas. Thus,
it has been argued that
[g]iven the importance of education in American society and the
importance of the emotional, intellectual and moral development of the child, the courts should play an active role in insuring that the high school student is exposed to the 'marketplace
of ideas.' Because the teacher is in the best position to facilitate
the students' free inquiry, given the reciprocal nature of
is the best protector of that
academic freedom, the teacher
72
right to academic freedom.
In its 1974 Position Statement on the Freedom to Teach and
Learn, the National Council for the Social Studies, representing
344 U.S. at 196.
354 U.S. at 250.
" 364 U.S. at 487.
70 385 U.S. at 603.
71 Wieman and Keyishian involved public employee loyalty oaths. Sweezy
dealt with a college professor's refusal to answer questions about his political affiliations and the contents of his lecture at a state university. Shelton concerned a
state statute compelling public school teachers and college professors to reveal
their organizational memberships.
Comment, 15 J. FAM. LAW 706, 730 (1977).
The question arises, however, whether a teacher has standing to raise the

rights of students in contested actions. In Mercer v. State Bd. of Educ., 379 F.
Supp. 580 (E.D Mich.), affd mem., 419 U.S. 1081 (1974), the court rejected the con.
tention. In Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir.
1980), the Seventh Circuit refused to allow students to raise the constitutional

rights of their teachers. "It is difficult to conceive how a student may assert a
right to have the teacher control the classroom when the teacher herself does not
have such a right." Id. at 1307.
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teachers from kindergarten through graduate school, stated
that:
Professional educators must set an example in their communities that illustrates their respect for schools and classrooms as a
free marketplace of ideas as well as an appreciation for the concerns of parents and other members of the community who legitimately disagree. By showing our faith as educators in the
clash of opposing viewpoints, we can hope to achieve a society
that functions according to this precept.73
The notion of teacher professionalism is also raised as a
basis of academic freedom. National educational organizations
claim that their members have a professional entitlement to
classroom academic freedom. The National Education Association, the largest teacher organization in the country with a
membership of 1.8 million, maintains that public schools should
"stimulate the spirit of inquiry, the acquisition of knowledge and
understanding, and the thoughtful formulation of worthy goals."74
It supports academic freedom and tenure as "essential to the
teaching profession."75 The National Council for the Social
Studies (NCSS) established its policy regarding academic freedom in the 1974 Position Statement on Student Rights and Responsibilities. The NCSS maintains that all educators have a
professional right as well as a responsibility to maintain academic freedom in the classroom.
A teacher's freedom to teach involves both the right and the
responsibility to use the highest intellectual standards in studying, investigating, presenting, interpreting, and discussing facts
and ideas relevant to his or her field of professional competence. As professionals, teachers must be free to examine
controversial issues openly in the classroom. The right to do so
is based on the democratic commitment to open inquiry and on
the importance to decision-making of the expression of opposing
informed views and the free examination of ideas. The teacher
is professionally obligated to maintain a spirit of free inquiry,
open-mindedness and impartiality in the classroom."
73

NCCS,

POSITION STATEMENT OF THE FREEDOM TO TEACH AND THE FREEDOM

TO LEARN (1974), reprinted in SOCIAL EDUCATION (April 1975)

[hereinafter cited as

NCSS (1974)].

11NEA, CODE OF ETHICS OF THE
71Id at policy 68-29.

EDUCATIONAL PROFESSION 2 (1968).

71 NCSS (1974), note 73 supra. The statement also includes the following
policy with respect to academic freedom and students.
Where applicable all students shall have those rights, of academic

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1981

23

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 4

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

These position statements are often argued in support of
teacher entitlement of classroom academic freedon in the case
law.
IV.

CONTEMPORARY PATTERNS OF DECISION MAKING
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS

In this part, the pattern of federal court decision making
regarding teacher classroom academic freedom is reviewed. To
assist the reader, a table has been developed which charts the
decisions. See Table 1. Several caveats are in order. First, the
table includes only those United States Supreme Court and circuit court of appeals decisions which either directly involve
teacher classroom academic freedom or are sufficiently related
to be instructive. Second, there are a growing number of federal
district court decisions from these circuits which likely will
freedom as specified by the National Council for the Social Studies in its
previous Policy Statements. All students should be able to:
1. develop intellectually without censorship;
2. raise questions on political, social, moral, economic and religious
issues in appropriate situations;
3. disagree with their teacher on such issues;
4. study a variety of materials, sources, and perspectives.
In Ambach v. Norwick, the Supreme Court upheld New York State's right to
deny public school teaching certificates to aliens. Justice Powell, writing for the
five-person majority, acknowledged the teacher's independent role as a professionah
Within the public school system, teachers play a critical part in developing students' attitudes toward government and understanding of the
role of citizens in our society. Alone among employees of the system,
teachers are in direct, day-to-day contact with students both in the
classrooms and in the other varied activities of a modern school. In
shaping the students' experience to achieve educationalgoals, teachers
by necessity have wide discretionover the way the course material is
communicated to students. . . . No amount of standardization of

teaching materials or lesson plans can eliminate the personal qualities a
teacher brings to bear in achieving these goals. Further, a teacher
serves as a role model for his students, exerting subtle but important
influence over their perceptions and values. Thus, through both the
presentation of course materials and the example he sets, a teacher has
an opportunity to influence the attitudes of students toward government, the political process, and a citizen's social responsibilities. This influence is crucial to the continued good health of a democracy.
441 U.S. 68, 78-79 (1978) (emphasis added).
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change the pattern as they move into the appellate stage. These
cases have been included in the discussion."
A.

JudicialSupportfor Teacher Classroom Academic Freedom

While the United States Supreme Court has not issued a ruling directly involving public school teacher classroom academic
freedom, several opinions have touched on the issue. Five are
briefly discussed here, beginning with the oldest, Meyer v.
Nebraska.8 Meyer involved the conviction of a private school
teacher who taught reading in the German language to a ten
year-old pupil. This violated a Nebraska law prohibiting
teachers from teaching "any subject to any person in any
language other than the English language"79 below the eighth
grade. The Court concluded that the statute "attempted materially to interfere with the calling of modern language teachers,
with the opportunities of pupils to acquire knowledge, and with
the power of parents to control the education of their own."8
Justice McReynolds, author of the Court's opinion, especially
noted that Meyer's "right thus to teach and the right of parents
to engage him so to instruct their children, we think, are within
the liberty of the [Fourteenth] Amendment."8 '
Of course, Meyer involved a private, not public school,
though the statute applied to "any private, denominational, parochial or public school."82 Furthermore, Justice McReynolds
noted that no challenge was being made to "the State's power to
83
prescribe a curriculum for institutions which it supports.
" There are also federal district court decisions supportive of teacher
classroom academic freedom from circuits not listed in the table. These have been
referred to periodically in the footnotes.
,8262 U.S. 390 (1923).
Id at 397.

Id at 401.

Id. at 400.
Id. at 397.
Id. at 402. Goldstein focuses on this aspect of the opinion in asserting that
Meyer has no relevance to public school teachers' claims to academic freedom in
the classroom. See Goldstein, supra note 48, at 1305-16. While Goldstein's factual
analysis is correct, the Meyer decision clearly has influenced expansion of public
school teacher classroom rights. As Goldstein notes, Justice Fortas uses Meyer as
precedent for his statement in Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 105 (1968), sup-
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Nevertheless, the decision has been relied upon sufficiently in
later cases to warrant inclusion among cases supportive of
teacher classroom freedom. 4
The second decision does not involve teacher academic
freedom at all. However, West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette5 often has been cited to support the "open
forum" concept of the school classroom." In Barnette, Justice
Jackson declared in the course of the Court's opinion striking
down the compulsory flag salute that
[boards of education] have, of course, important, delicate, and
highly discretionary functions, but none that they may not perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights. That they are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not
to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.'
88
The third case, Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
involved a college professor at a public institution, but it directly relates to
academic freedom in the classroom. Sweezy was judged in contempt by New Hampshire courts after refusing to answer certain
questions put to him by the Attorney General, or to reveal the

porting "the freedom of teachers to teach and students to learn" in the public
schools and for his assertion in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School Dist.,
393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) that neither "teachers [nor] students shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the school-house gate."
These cases have been relied on by the lower courts in extending teacher
classroom academic freedom. See, e.g., Dean v. Timpson Independent School Dist.
486 F. Supp. at 308 ("Epperson teaches that a particular subject or theory may
not be forbidden in the classroom simply because it offends the dominant views or
beliefs of a community."), and Webb v. Lake Mills Community School Dist. 344 F.
Supp. 791, 803 (N.D. Iowa 1972) (The Supreme Court has found proscriptions
against the teaching of foreign languages in the public schools ... repugnant to
the Constitution.")
262 U.S. at id.
319 U.S. 624 (1943).
See, e.g., Riga, Yoder and Free Exercise, 7 J. L. AND EDUC. 449 (1978).
Riga asserts that "[t]he logical conclusion [of Barnette] is too evident: any compulsion in education is necessarily unconstitutional." Id. at 454. See also Aarons, The
Separation of School and State: Pierce Reconsidered, 46 HARV. EDUC. Rrv. 76,
86-90 (1976).
319 U.S. at 637.
" 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
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contents of a lecture given in a humanities course at the University of New Hampshire. In ruling for Sweezy, Chief Justice Warren wrote that "[t]eachers and students must always remain free
to inquire, to study, and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and
understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and
die."89
Table 1:

Judicial Response to Teacher Classroom Academic
Freedom
SUPPORTIVE

Supreme Court
Meyer v. Nebraska (1923)
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1923)
Sweezy v. New Hampshire (1957)
Keyishian v. Board of Regents (1967)
*Epperson v. Arkansas (1968)
First Circuit
*Keefe v. Geanakos (1969)
*Mailloux v. Kiley (1971)
Second Circuit
James v. Board of Education (1972)
Russo v. Central School District (1972)
Fifth Circuit
*Kingsville Independent School District v. Cooper (1980)
Sixth Circuit
Minarcini v. Strongsville City School District (1974)

UNSUPPORTIVE
Supreme Court
Mercer v. Michigan (1974)
8 I&at 250.
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First Circuit

Drown v. Portsmouth School District (1970)
Second Circuit
Presidents Council v. Community School Board (1972)
*East Hartford Education Association v. Board of Education (1977)
Trachtman v. Anker (1977)
Fourth Circuit
Parker v. Board of Education (1965)
*Frison v. Franklin (1979)
Seventh Circuit
*Brubaker v. Board of Education (1974)
*Palmer v. Board of Education (1979)
Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp (1980)
Eighth Circuit
*Ahern v. Board of Education (1972)
*Birdwell v. Hazelwood School District (1974)
Tenth Circuit
*Adams v. Campbell City School District (1975)
*Powers v. Mancos School District (1977)
*Cary v. Board of Education (1979)
*Decisions relating directly to academic freedom in the public
school classroom.
In Keyishian v. Board of Regents," another case involving
college professors, the Court struck down the New York loyalty
law. Justice Brennan, citing several cases including Sweezy,
noted that academic freedom is "a special concern of the First
Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom."91
The fifth United States Supreme Court decision included in
Table 1 is Epperson v. Arkansas.2 The Court struck down a
385 U.S. 589 (1967).

Id. at 603.
393 U.S. 97 (1968).
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state law prohibiting the teaching of evolution in the public
schools. Of the five cases, Epperson provides the most support
of teacher academic freedom in the classroom. Asserting that
"[o]ur courts ... have not failed to apply the First Amendment's
mandate in our educational system where essential to safeguard
the fundamental values of freedom of speech and inquiry and
belief,"93 Justice Fortas acknowledged "the broad premise which
the Court's decision in Meyer furnishes" in support of the
"freedom of teachers to teach and of students to learn."94 He added
that "it is much too late to argue that the State may impose
upon the teachers in its schools any conditions it chooses, however restrictive they may be of constitutional guarantees." 5
However, the Court did not decide the case on the basis of
teacher academic freedom, choosing instead to invalidate the
anti-evolution law as an impermissible advancement of religion
under the establishment clause of the first amendment.
Concurring in the result, Justice Stewart sought to clarify
his position on the power of the state over the curriculum versus the teacher's claim to academic freedom. He agreed that a
state could decide that only one foreign language would be
taught in the public school system, but doubted that a state
could punish a teacher for asserting in the classroom that other
languages existed.
It is one thing for a State to determine that 'the subject of
higher mathematics, or astronomy, or biology' shall or shall not
be included in its public school curriculum. It is quite another
thing for a State to make it a criminal offense for a public school
teacher so much as to mention the very existence of an entire
system of respected human thought. That kind of criminal law, I
think, would clearly impinge upon the guarantees of free communication contained in the First Amendment, and made applicable to the State by the Fourteenth."

Id at 104.
9"Id. at 105-06. See in this context the discussion, at note 83, supra.
9 Id at 107.
Id at 116 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Black, in his concurring opinion, stated the opposite view. "I am ... not ready to hold that a person hired to
teach school children takes with him into the classroom a constitutional right to
teach sociological, economic, political, or religious subjects that the school's
managers do not want discussed." Id. at 113-14 (Black, J., concurring).
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These cases have furnished the lower federal courts so inclined with the opportunity to expand teacher classroom academic freedom. So far, only four of the circuit courts of appeal
have endorsed some degree of classroom freedom for the public
school teacher. Two cases place the First Circuit in this
category.
The first, Keefe v. Geanakos 7 involved a tenured English
teacher who assigned an article to his class from Atlantic Monthly
containing the word "motherfucker." The school district suspended the teacher and sought his discharge for assigning the
article and discussing how the word had been used in the article.
The appeals court identified the issue as "whether a teacher
may, for demonstrated educational purposes, quote a 'dirty'
word currently used in order to give special offense, or whether
the shock is too great for high school seniors to stand."98 Noting
the absence of a school policy on the question, that the library
contained books with the same word, and that the availability of
money damages would not amelorate the issue, the court reversed the district court's decision.
We accept the conclusion of the court below that 'some measure
of public regulation of classroom speech is inherent in every
provision of public education.' But when we consider the facts
at bar as we have elaborated them, we find it difficult not to
think that its application to the present case demeans any proper
concept of education."
However, the court never stated clearly its position on
teacher academic freedom when it reversed the district court's
denial of an interlocutory decree pending a decision on the mertis.
The First Circuit reaffirmed its Keefe decision in Mailloux
v. Kiley,100 but refused to go as far as the district court in endorsing teacher classroom academic freedom. The case involved a
eleventh grade English teacher who used the word "fuck" in
class to illustrate a taboo word in American society. In its deci" 305 F. Supp. 1091 (D. Mass.), rev'd, 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969).
98418 F.2d 359, 361.
11 323 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971) (per
curiam).
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sion, the district court cited the proposition that a teacher has
not only a constitutional "civic right to freedom of speech both
outside . . . and inside . . . the schoolhouse, but also some
measure of academic freedom as to his in-classroom teaching." '
The court said the Keefe and Parducci decisions upheld two
kinds of academic freedom:
the substantive right of a teacher to choose a teaching method
which in the court's view served a demonstrated educational
purpose; and the procedural right of a teacher not to be discharged for the use of a teaching method which was not proscribed by a regulation, and as to which it was not proven that
he should have had notice that its use was prohibited. 2
The appeals court affirmed the decision, but declined to endorse the lower court's "sensitive effort to devise guidelines"
for weighing academic freedom issues." 3 Declaring that "we suspect that any such formulation would introduce more problems
than it would resolve,"104 the appeals court stated that, "[a]t present we see no substitute for a case-by-case inquiry into whether
the legitimate interests of the authorities are demonstrably suf..
,323 F. Supp. at 1390.
102Id.
0I Federal District Court Judge Wyzanski set forth these guidelines in his
opinion:
[T]his court rules that when a secondary school teacher uses a teaching
method which he does not prove has the support of the preponderant
opinion of the teaching profession or of the part of it to which he
belongs, but which he merely proves is relevant to his subject and
students, is regarded by experts of significant standing as serving a
serious educational purpose, and was used by him in good faith, the
state may suspend or discharge a teacher for using that method but it
may not resort to such drastic sanctions unless the state proves he was
put on notice either by a regulation or otherwise that he should not use
that method. This exclusively procedural protection is afforded to a
teacher not because he is a state employee, or because he is a citizen,
but because in his teaching capacity he is engaged in the exercise of
what may plausibly be considered 'vital First Amendment rights.' [citation omitted]. In his teaching capacity he is not required to 'guess what

conduct or utterance may lose him his position.'

. .

. If he did not have

the right to be warned before he was discharged, he might be more
timid that it is in the public interest that he should be, and he might
steer away from reasonable methods with which it is in the public interest to experiment.
Id. at 1392.
1" 448 F.2d at 1243.
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ficient to circumscribe a teacher's speech."'u 5 Thus, while public
school teachers in the First Circuit have some degree of first
amendment protection to engage in classroom discussion with
older students and to choose teaching methodology, the demar10 6
cations are unclear.

"I Id. The court tried to place its earlier holding in Keefe in perspective by
noting that:
free speech does not grant teachers a license to say or write in class

whatever they may feel like .

.

. the propriety of regulations or sanc-

tions must depend on such circumstances as the age and sophistication
of the students, the closeness of the relation between the specific
techniques used and some concededly valid educational objective, and
the context and manner of presentation.
1d.

106Several district courts in other circuits have relied on these cases. Thus, a
district court in the Eighth Circuit relied on Keefe, Mailloux, and Parducci in
ordering reinstatement of a high school drama teacher dismissed from her job
when school officials objected to some aspects of play rehearsals (drinking scenes,
use of vulgarity). Webb v. Lake Mills Community School Dist., 344 F. Supp. 791
(N.D. Iowa 1972). The court concluded that the arbitrary and capricious standards
used by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit to assess the
legality of school official acts "means much the same thing" as the rationale advanced in these cases. Thus, the district court held that teachers enjoy two kinds
of academic freedom:
the substantive right of a teacher to choose a teaching method which in
the court's view served a demonstrated educational teaching purpose
and the procedural right of a teacher not to be discharged for the use of
a teaching method which was not proscribed by a regulation, and as to
which it was not shown that the teacher should have had notice that its
use was prohibited.
Id. at 799. Cf., Ahern v. Board of Educ., 327 F. Supp. 1391 (D. Neb. 1971), aff'd, 456
F.2d 399 (8th Cir. 1972). In Wilson v. Chancellor, 418 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Ore. 1976),
a district court in the Ninth Circuit specifically declined to reach the academic
freedom issue. "This case can be decided by using purely conventional freedom of
expression analysis." Id. at 1362. Then, citing Keefe, Parducci,and Sterzing v. Ft.
Bend Independent School Dist., 376 F. Supp. 657 (S.D. Tex. 1972), vacated as to
remedy and remanded, 496 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam), the court held that
a school board ban on political speakers violated the teacher's freedom to use a
teaching method.
The art of teaching is a form of expression, and the methods used in
teaching are media. Wilson's use of political speakers was his medium
for teaching; similarly, the short story was Parducci's medium and the
article containing the controversial word was Keefe's medium. The
various school boards which restricted the media employed by Wilson
here, and by Keefe, Parducci, and Sterzing in the cases cited, suppressed
expression which the First Amendment protects.
Id. at 1363-64.
See also Moore v. Gaston County Bd. of Educ., 357 F. Supp. 1037 (W.D.N.C.
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In the Second Circuit, the principal cases involving teacher
10 7
classroom academic freedom are James v. Board of Education
and Russo v. Central School District.'" James involved the
dismissal of an eleventh grade public school teacher who wore a
black armband protesting the Vietnamese War in his classes. In
reversing the lower court's summary judgment for the school
district, Judge Kaufman framed the issue and the appeals
court's answer thusly.
We are asked to decide whether a Board of Education, without
transgressing the first amendment, may discharge an 11th
grade English teacher who did no more than wear a black armband in class in symbolic protest against the Vietnam War, although it is agreed that the armband did not disrupt classroom
activities, and as far as we know did not have any influence on
any students and did not engender protest from any student,
teacher or parent. We hold that the Board may not take such
action."
On remand, the district court held that the school district
failed to justify dismissal and ordered compensatory damages
and attorneys' fees for the plaintiff.110
James, of course, does not go as far in protecting classroom
academic freedom as the decisions of the First Circuit, primarily
because it involves symbolic, rather than overt, expression. The
same is true of the other Second Circuit decision, Russo v. Central School District."' In Russo, Judge Kaufman reversed and
remanded a lower court decision dismissing a teacher's suit
against the school board after she was discharged for not
leading the class in pledging allegiance to the flag. Noting that
the Supreme Court had upheld the right of students to refuse
1973) (cites Parducciand Marilloux in some detail, but orders teacher's reinstatement on establishment clause grounds), and Downs v. Conway School Dist., 328 F.
Supp. 338 (E.D. Ark. 1971) (relies in part on Parducciin supporting elementary
teacher's claim to a denial of first amendment freedoms when she was dismissed
for voicing various complaints, including a request that her students be served
raw, rather than cooked, carrots).
101461 F.2d 566 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972), on remand, 385 F.
Supp. 209 (W.D.N.Y. 1974).
' 469 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1972), cerL denied, 411 U.S. 932 (1973).
461 F.2d at 568.
II

385 F. Supp. at 217.

469 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1972).
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the flag pledge in West Virginia State Board of Education,"'
Judge Kaufman wrote that
There is little room in what Mr. Justice Jackson once called the
'majestic generalities of the Bill of Rights' [citation omitted] for
an interpretation of the First Amendment that would be more
restrictive with respect to teachers than it is with respect to
their students, where there has been no interference with the
requirement of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school ....

"

As noted in the next section, the Second Circuit's Presidents
Council Districtv. Community School Board"' decision, together
with Trachtman v. Anker,"5 suggests that support for teacher
classroom academic freedom in this circuit is lukewarm at best.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit encountered the
public school teacher academic freedom issue in a case predating
Kingsville Independent School District v. Cooper."' However,
the court did not take the assertive position in support of
teacher academic freedom evidenced in Kingsville. The earlier
case, Moore v. Winfield City Board of Education,""involved a
1,2

319 U.S. 624 (1943).

469 F.2d at 631-32. See also Palmer v. Board of Educ., 466 F. Supp. 600
(N.D. Ill.), affd, 603 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1026 (1980)
(Russo distinguished in upholding dismissal of teacher who refused to salute the
flag for religious reasons), and Hanover v. Northrup, 325 F. Supp. 170 (D. Conn.
1970) (violation of first amendment rights to dismiss a junior high school teacher
who refused to lead her class in the salute to the flag because she believed the
phrase "with liberty and justice for all" was an untrue statement).
In Bayer v. Kingzler, 383 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D. N.Y. 1974), aff'd without opinion, 515 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1975), the district court relied in part on Russo in declaring that the seizure and prohibition of distribution of a sex education supplement
to a high school newspaper violated the students' first and fourteenth amendment
rights of expression. Judge Costantino stated that:
It is relevant to note that in Russo [citation omitted] the court in dictum
recognized that tenth graders were sufficiently mature that a teaclier's
symbolic act in failing to lead the flag salute would not have a 'destructive effect' on her students .... Responsible presentation of information
about birth control to high school students is not to be dreaded.
Id.at 1164.
"' 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1972).
426 F. Supp. 198 (S.D. N.Y. 1976), rev'd, 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977).
"l

,'

611 F.2d 1109.

452 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1971). See also Fred v. Board of Public Instruction,
415 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1969) (community college teachers did state a cause of ac117
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teacher who claimed her contract was not renewed because of
her activities as president of a teacher association. In affirming
the lower court ruling in support of the school board, the appeals panel emphasized the limited extent of teacher rights of
expression. "The constitutionally protected right of a public
schoolteacher to criticize the school administration and to comment on matters of public concern is a limited right, a right
which must be balanced against the need for orderly school administration." 118
Prior to the Kingsville ruling, there were several interesting district court decisions in this circuit. The first is the
oft-cited Parducci v. Rutland"' case, in which the court ruled
that dismissal of an eleventh grade English teacher for assigning Kurt Vonnegut's Welcome to the Monkey House infringed
her first amendment rights. The teacher, Marilyn Parducci,
maintained she had a professional obligation to teach the story,
and that the denial of her right to do so was done in the absence
of standards governing the selection of course materials. Ms. Parducci was considered an effective teacher and would have received a favorable evaluation from her principal but for the incident. In its decision, the court began by declaring that teacher
entitlement to first amendment freedoms was certain, but
agreed that academic freedom is not absolute. "This court is
keenly aware of the state's vital interest in protecting the impressionable minds of its young people from any form of extreme propagandism in the classroom.""' However, in this instance, the court found the reading appropriate for high school
students. "Since the defendants have failed to show either that
the assignment was inappropriate reading for high school juniors,
or that it created a significant disruption to the educational processes of this school, this Court concludes that plaintiff's
dismissal constituted an unwarranted invasion of her First
Amendment right to academic freedom."'' . Judge Johnson added
tion under the first amendment in alleging that their contracts were not renewed
because of their activities in a teacher association. "Simply because teachers are
on the public payroll does not make them second-class citizens in regard to their
constitutional rights." Id. at 855).
"'

452 F.2d at 728.

,' 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
12Id. at 355 (emphasis in original).
"I Id. at 356.
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that the absence of standards for choosing curriculum materials
compounded the problem.
[W]e are concerned not merely with vague standards, but with
the total absence of standards. When a teacher is forced to speculate as to what conduct is permissible and what conduct is
proscribed, he is apt to be overly cautious and reserved in the
classroom. Such a reluctance on the part of the teacher to investigate and experiment with new and different ideas is anathema to the entire concept of academic freedom."
A second district court decision in this circuit directly
related to public school teacher classroom academic freedom is
123 The case inSterzing v. Ft. Bend Independent School District.
volved a high school civics teacher who engaged frequently in
classroom discussion on controversial topics, e.g., race relations,
and occasionally supplemented the textbook with additional materials, e.g., a fund solicitation letter on behalf of students arrested during an anti-war protest which was used to illustrate
how interest groups seek to arouse public support. After several
run-ins with school officials, Henry Sterzing was dismissed.
After reviewing the disputed material and the record,

'

the

1 Id. at 357. Suppose the school district had written standards which
precluded Marilyn Parducci's selecting the Vonnegut reading. Would the outcome
have been different, or would the school district have had the added burden of
showing the exclusion of the Vonnegut reading to be appropriate in light of student age and the possibility of disruption? While Judge Johnson did not directly
address this issue, he did state that "[h]owever wide the discretion of school officials, such discretion cannot be exercised so as to arbitrarily deprive teachers of
their First Amendment rights." Id. Still, it seems reasonable to believe that had
there been specific curriculum standards for selecting readings, the school would
have been on firmer ground, given the general judicial recognition of the school
districts' control of the curriculum. For a discussion of the implications of Parducci and other cases supportive of teacher academic freedom, see notes 211-12
infra and accompanying text.
'3 376 F. Supp. 657 (S.D. Tex. 1972), vacated as to remedy and remanded,
496 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
,2, Judge Bue found it strange that the principal had never visited Henry
Sterzing's classroom and was unfamiliar with his teaching methods. Judge Bue
added, "[y]et it is this pattern of unfamiliarity which seems to permeate the socalled chain of command, culminating with the board, which then proceeded to act
and reach decisions without the benefit of firsthand knowledge as to what was going on in Mr. Sterzing's classroom." Id. at 661. It is apparent that the absence of
effective personnel evaluation and a consequently well-documented record may
seriously undermine the credibility of school officials in the eyes of many judges.
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court found for the plaintiff. While acknowledging that "a
teacher's methods are not without limits," Judge Bue added
that, "[iut would be ill-advised to presume that a teacher would
be limited, in essence, to a single textbook in teaching a course
today in civics and social studies.""' The court asserted that,
"[t]he freedom of speech of a teacher and a citizen of the United
States must not be so lightly regarded that he stands in jeopardy of dismissal for raising controversial issues in an eager but
'
At the same time, Judge Bue cautioned
disciplined classroom."126
that classroom academic freedom places a heavy responsibility
on the teacher:
must also be that a teacher's duty to be exceptionally fair and
[i]t
objective in presenting his personally held opinions, to actively
and persuasively present different views, in addition to open
discussion. It is the duty of the teacher to be cognizant of and
sensitive to the feelings of his students, their parents, and their
community. 1"
Since the school did not or could not produce any evidence of
material disruption, insubordination,'28 or abuse of professional
standards, the court sided with the plaintiff. However, rather
than reinstate Sterzing, the court awarded monetary damages.
Judge Bue feared reinstatement would "only serve to revive antagonisms."" It was this aspect of the case that the Fifth Circuit panel found troubling. In a per curiam decision, the appeals
court vacated the remedy and remanded the case. The court observed in a footnote that it was confining itself solely to the
issue of remedy; therefore, it expressed no view on the constitutional question.' 0
As noted previously, the Fifth Circuit's ruling in Kingsville
2
confined itself to classroom discussion as a protected right. '
,1 376 F. Supp. at 661.
126

Id

"IId. See in this respect Burns v. Rovaldi, discussed at note 44 supra and
accompanying text.
"' The court observed that Sterzing's two immediate department supervisors had generally approved his teaching procedures and general conduct. Id
Cf. Moore v. School Bd., 364 F. Supp. 355 (N.D. Fla. 1973) (teacher has no right to
use biology class as a springboard for criticisms of school officials or relating
descriptions of experiences with prostitutes).

'2Id at 663.
496 F.2d at 93 n.3.
"'

See notes 1-2 infra and accompanying text.
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Since Ms. Cooper had not been instructed to cease using the simulation technique, the matter of academic freedom to choose
teaching methodogy or materials was not involved. However, a
Texas district court ruling which occurred about the same time
as Kingsville reaches this issue. Dean v. Timpson Independent
2 involved the discharge of a teacher who introSchool District"'
duced a sex role survey printed in Psychology Today into her
high school psychology and speech classes.133 Dean, a wellrespected teacher who had taught in the district for six years,
earlier had encountered criticism from the school principal and
district superintendent over an ethics survey dealing with a
number of social issues, e.g., use of hallucinogenic drugs,
euthanasia. While evidence conflicted, the court concluded that
Dean had not been instructed effectively about the future use of
supplementary materials in class as a result of these earlier runins with school officials. No memoranda were made nor were
written policies evident in the school's policy handbook about
the use of classroom materials.
The sex-role survey was administered by a student on Dean's
instructions. It appears that the teacher had not actually
adapted the survey for classroom use, nor had she read the Psychology Today article in its entirety. However, the student respondents were advised to omit certain questions dealing with
sexual activity and to feel free not to respond to others. No significant disruption occurred in the classes or in the school. However, the matter became a major issue in the conservative east
Texas community of Timpson.
Judge Robert M. Parker concluded that use of the surveys
constituted the sole reason for Dean's discharge. Not aware of
the Kingsville decision, Judge Parker relied on most of the
cases already discussed in holding that "a teacher has a constitutional right protected by the First Amendment to engage in a
teaching method of his or her own choosing, even though the
subject matter may be controversial or sensitive."13 ' This statement appears to be the most specific endorsement to date of
teacher academic freedom in the selection of teaching methodolZ 486 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Tex. 1979).

The survey in question was entitled "Masculinity-What it Means to be a
Man." It appears in the March, 1976, issue of Psychology Today.
" 486 F. Supp. at 307.
'
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ogy. While Judge Parker concurred with Parducci and similar
rulings that teacher academic freedom is not absolute, he asserted that attempts to regulate it must be specifically worded
and clearly promulgated. Thus, even if the conference between
Dean and school officials triggered by the Ethics Survey was
construed as an official policy against using other surveys, the
judgment would be the same. "If the Court takes Mr. Bogue and
Mr. Higginbotham at their word and disregards the testimony of
Ms. Dean, it would, nevertheless, reach the same result.
Whatever restriction that might have been placed on Ms. Dean
13
in the course of a conversation would be void for vagueness.""
The court ordered reinstatement, back pay, and attorney's
fees. This case, coinciding with the Kingsville decision, places
the Fifth Circuit in the forefront of judicial support for teacher
academic freedom. What has yet to be decided is how far a
school district can go in restricting teacher classroom academic
freedom by developing and promulgating specific policy statements. 3 '
The Sixth Circuit indirectly recognized a right to classroom
academic freedom in Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dis37
trict.1
Minarcini involved an attempt by the school board to
remove allegedly distasteful books from the school library. In
the course of declaring the school board's actions unconstituthe court gave tangential attention to academic
tional,'
Id. at 309.
In a case involving the discharge of a public mental hospital administrator
who spoke out against hospital policies, a Rhode Island district court asked
rhetorically, "Is it too much to recognize ... that members of a profession have,
as a matter of conscience, commitments to standards and philosophies of practice;
and that, at least without clear agency rules to the contrary, they may not be
disciplined for expressing the dictates of their professional conscience?" Pilkington v. Bevilacqua, 439 F. Supp. 465, 479 n.11 (D.R.I. 1977). It would seem that the
presence of a clearly worded policy statement would be a material factor in
teacher classroom academic freedom cases. See note 211 infra and accompanying
text regarding a need for specific policy statements.
" 384 F. Supp. 698 (N.D. Ohio 1974), affd in part, 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir.
1976).
1-For censorship cases in other circuits in accord, see Pico v. Board of
Educ., 638 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'g, 474 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), cert
granted,50 U.S.L.W. 3265 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1981); Gambino v. Fairfax County School
Bd., 564 F.2d 157 (4th Cir.) (per curiam), affg, 429 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Va. 1977);
Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 1979); Right to Read
l3
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freedom in the classroom. It noted that the public school library
has an important relationship to the classroom.
If one of the English teachers considered Joseph Heller's Catch
22 to be one of the more important modern American novels ....
we assume that no one would dispute that the First Amendment's protection of academic freedom would protect both his
right to say so in class and his students' right to hear him and to
find and read the book.13

However, while recognizing that the school board's actions "had
a somewhat chilling effect upon classroom discussion," the appeals court affirmed the district court's conclusion that the
teachers' academic freedom had not been unconstitutionally infringed. The district court had entered this finding of fact:
Faculty members were not foreclosed or limited either formally
or informally, directly or indirectly, to utilize individual
teaching methodology or from discussing any subject including
the books here in issue or assigning said books as outside or
supplemental reading or the subject of a review in the course of
classroom instruction. No faculty member was intimidated, reprimanded, discharged or threatened with such action as a result of circumstances here involved .. . . 140
Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978). Contra,
Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Bd., 638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980), affg,
475 F. Supp. 615 (D. Vt. 1979); Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631
F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980); Presidents Council Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd.,
457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1972).
For recent discussions of school library censorship, see Niccolai, Right to
Read and SchoolLibrary Censorship, 10 J. L.AND EDUC. 23 (1981); Comment, Censoring the School Library: Do Students Have the Right to Read?, 10 CONN. L.
REV. 747 (1977); Comment, School Library Censorship: First Amendment
Guarantee and the Student's Right to Know, 57 U. DET. J. UnB. L. 523 (1980);
Comment, ConstitutionalAspects of Removing Books from School Libraries, 66
KY. L.J. 127 (1977); Comment, First Amendment Limitations on the Power of
School Boards to Select and Remove High School Text and LibraryBooks, 52 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 421 (1977). Niccolai makes the interesting observation that since
the school has control of the classroom curriculum, the library is the one place
where a diversity of viewpoints ought to be found. "It is, therefore, vital to the
citizenry and the duty of the state to maintain the school library as a true
marketplace of ideas, open to the works of controversial authors, differing
literary tastes and dissenting points of view." Niccolai, supra, at 32.
" 541 F.2d at 582.
40

384 F. Supp. at 708.
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Judicial Support for School Board Curricular Control

The Supreme Court has not issued a ruling directly related
to teacher classroom academic freedom. However, the Court has
recognized that teachers have constitutional rights within the
public school."' At the same time, several of these decisions provide the rationale for regulating, even curtailing, the exercise of
constitutional rights. Thus, for example, in Pickeringv. Board of
Education,' the Court recognized that the state has an interest
as an employer in regulating the expression rights of its employees. "The problem ... is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters
of public concern and the interests of the State, as an employer,
in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees."'' In Pickering,the Court advanced the
proposition that teacher comments outside of school "are acceptable if not made recklessly or with knowledge of their falsity
and do not impede school operations. 1 44 In the landmark Tinker
v. Des Moines School District4' decision, the majority asserted
that "[ilt can hardly be argued that either students or teachers
shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."'46 But Justice Fortas acknowledged
the Court's repeated support for the state's comprehensive
authority over school matters. He concluded, with respect to
students, that "conduct ... in class or out of it, which for any
reason ... materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial
disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not im147
munized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech."'
While Justice Fortas spoke of students, school officials and
judges have used the "materially disrupts-substantial invasion
of the rights of others" rationale to determine the appropriateness of teacher behavior as well. Pickering and its progeny,
11
12

See notes 50-71 supra and accompanying text.
391 U.S. 563 (1968).

, Id at 568.

Id See also the further restrictions on teacher expression imposed by Mt.
Healthy v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), and Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated
School Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1977).
"

1,5

393 U.S. 503.

Id at 506.
1

Id. at 513.
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along with Tinker, lay a foundation for curtailing teacher expression in or out of the classroom.
In 1974, the Court affirmed without opinion a district court
decision upholding the power of the state to regulate teacher
classroom expression. Mercer v. Michigan State Board of Education"' dealt with a teacher's suit against a state education law
prohibiting discussion of birth control in the public schools.
Mercer contended the prohibition infringed on his academic
freedom. However, the district court viewed the situation this
way:
Among other things, teachers are engaged to impart to the
students the various bodies of knowledge and learning contained
in and offered by the curriculum. There is nothing in the First
Amendment that gives a person employed to teach the Constitutional right to teach beyond the scope of the established curriculum. Nor are there any judicial decisions giving the teacher
the right to teach beyond an established curriculum." 9
Of course, the Court's affirmance does little to indicate the
Justices' views on the parameters of teacher classroom academic freedom. But it suggests the state has considerable authority to establish the curriculum and to expect teachers to
comply.
The remainder of this section reviews decisions of federal
appeals courts upholding the power of school officials in the face
of teacher claims of classroom academic freedom infringement.
Six circuits are in this category; refer to Table 1.
The First Circuit, already listed among those supportive of
teacher classroom freedom, has on at least one occasion sug379 F. Supp. 580 (E.D. Mich.), aff'd mem., 419 U.S. 1081 (1974).
F. Supp. at 585. Consider the implications of this statement in light of
Justice Stewart's observation supportive of teacher classroom commentary in Epperson, and in connection with the discussion of the Timpson ruling. Note 132-36
supra and accompanying text. Note also Circuit Judge Russell's dissent in Gambino v. Fairfax County School Bd., 564 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
I may add that it seems odd to me that ... the school administration
may validly forbid a teacher in the school system to instruct his or her
pupils in contraceptive practices, but is powerless to forbid the student
editor of the school paper, distributed to the pupils, under the school
sponsorship and with school support, from instructing on those same
practices in the columns of the school paper.
Id at 158 (Russell, J., dissenting).
149 379
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gested that it will not ignore the authority of school boards. In a
150
1970 case, Drown v. Portsmouth School District,
the First Circuit agreed that a dismissed teacher has a right to a list of
reasons for her termination. The list led to a follow-up suit in
which the teacher claimed the reasons submitted were arbitrary
and capricious. 15' In his second discussion of the case, Judge Coffin relied on a statement he had maae in Drown I implying that
"non-renewal of a teacher for being 'too innovative and unconventional' would be proper under the wide discretion accorded
to the school board. . . . [citation omitted], even if a court or
another board would think it wiser to have innovative but 'uncooperative' teachers rather than bland 'cooperative ones."" 2 Although classroom academic freedom was not at issue in Drown
II, the decision would appear to affirm school board power over
teacher classroom behavior.'53
Balancing James v. Board of Educationand Russo v. Central
54
School District'
in the Second Circuit is the oft-cited Presidents Council decision," which squarely supports school board
authority. The case involved the removal of various allegedly objectionable books from a school library by action of the local
school board. In upholding the power of the local board to do so,
Circuit Judge Mulligan repeated the traditional approach courts
have taken in such matters:
The ensuing shouts of book burning, witch hunting and violation of academic freedom hardly elevate this intramural strife
to first amendment constitutional proportions. If it did, there
would be a constant intrusion of the judiciary into the internal
435 F.2d 1182 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 972 (1971).
She was primarily concerned with reason number two. "While your class
work was assessed as 'satisfactory' the English Department at the high school
reports that you have been uncooperative, disregarding schedules and not accepting direction." Id. at 1108.
'

Ill

"'

Id. at 1109.

z Note that the First Circuit also backed away from its Keefe decision in
Mailloux, claiming that there could be no substitute for a case-by-case analysis in
situations involving teacher speech. See notes 97-105 supra and accompanying
text. Drown I and II, in combination with Mailloux, suggest that the First Circuit
accords teacher classroom academic freedom only limited support.
154 See notes 107-08 supra and accompanying text.
' Presidents Council, Dist. No. 25 v. Community School Bd., 457 F.2d 289
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972). For other cases involving the removal
of books from the school library, see note 138 supra.
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affairs of the school. Academic freedom is scarcely fostered by
the intrusion of three or even nine federal jurists making curriculum or library choices for the community of scholars. When
the court has intervened, the circumstances have been rare and
extreme and the issues presented totally distinct from those we
have here.'-

In 1977, the Second Circuit faced lengthy and tangled litigation over what appeared to be a relatively simple matter-a
teacher dress code.15 The teacher, Richard Brimley, brought
suit in district court claiming that the school dress code requiring all male teachers to wear a coat and tie denied him his first
and fourteenth amendment guarantees. The lower court dismissed the complaint, and the teacher appealed. Initially, a
three-judge panel ruled in favor of the teacher and remanded
the case for a hearing on the merits. Judge Meskill dissented.
He petitioned for a rehearing en banc, and wrote the opinion
reversing the three-judge panel. Judge Meskill cited Presidents
Council in support of broad school board authority and included
this statement from James v. Board of Education."8
" 457 F.2d at 292. Note this interesting footnote in the opinion: "While the
First Circuit has indicated that it does not 'regret' its decision in Keefe v.
Geanakos, its enthusiasm for intrusion into academic issues seems to be lessening, see Mailloux v. Kiley ...." 457 F.2d at 294 n.7 (citations omitted). The
Supreme Court refused to hear Presidents Council. 409 U.S. 998 (1972). Justice
Douglas, however, dissented:
Actions of school boards are not immune from constitutional scrutiny.
Academic freedom has been upheld against attack on various fronts.
The First Amendment involves not only a right to speak and publish,
but also the right to hear, to learn, and to know. And this Court has
recognized that this right to know is 'nowhere more vital than in our
schools and universities'

. ...

In Tinker the Court held that the First Amendment can only be
restricted in the schools when a disciplinary problem is raised. No such
allegation is asserted here. What else can the school board now decide
it doesn't like? Are we sending our children to school to be educated by
the norms of the School Board or are we educating our youth to shed
the prejudices of the past, to explore all forms of thought, and to find
solutions to our world's problems?
Id- at 998-1000 (citations omitted) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari). For cases in accord and contra Presidents Council, see note 138 supra.
"' East Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 405 F. Supp. 94 (D. Conn.
1975), aff'd en banc, 562 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1977).
" See note 107 supra and accompanying text.
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The interest of the state in promoting the efficient operation of
its schools extends beyond merely securing an orderly classroom. Although the pros and cons of progressive education are
debated heavily, a principal function of all elementary and
secondary education is indoctrinative-whether it be to teach
the ABC's or multiplication tables or to transmit the basic
vlues of the community.

59

Hence, the court concluded that "[in] view of the uniquely influential role of the public school teacher in the classroom, the

board is justified in imposing this regulation."'

0

' 562 F.2d at 859, quoting with approval, 461 F.2d 566, 573 (2d Cir. 1972).
Judge Meskill further asserted that in contrast to James and Russo, "[t]he
First Amendment claim made here is so insubstantial as to border on the
frivolous." 562 F.2d at 860. Judges Oakes and Smith did not see it this way. Finding for the plaintiff when the case was heard by a three-judge panel, they cited at
length the cases and articles supportive of academic freedom in the secondary
schools. Balancing the interests of the school board against the teacher liberty interest in personal grooming and academic freedom in the classroom setting, the
pair found for the latter.
Teenagers, who are so often rebellious against authority, may find a
tieless teacher to be a less remote, more contemporary individual with
whom they can more easily interact, and hence to whom they are better
prepared to listen with care and attention. It is highly questionable, and
certainly not established on this motion for summary judgment, that
the Board's valid end of prompting discipline is substantially, or even incrementally, furthered by the tie regulation.
Id. at 864 n.2.
On remand, the pair dissented, arguing that the majority trivialized the interests at stake in an apparent attempt to support traditional values.
Teaching methods in public high schools are in many instances protectible under the First Amendment ....While serious questions arise in
measuring the parameters of the right in the context of public high
school teaching, as the panel majority fully recognized, answers to those
questions are not aided by the ostrich-like presumption that they do not
exist.
Id.at 863-64 (Oakes, J., dissenting).
11 Id. at 863.
In Burns v. Rovaldi, 477 F. Supp. 270 (D. Conn. 1979), a district court case in
the Second Circuit involving the dismissal of a fifth grade teacher for engaging
his class in a penmanship pen-pal activity that led to the students receiving a letter from the teacher's fiance advocating the communist philosophy, the court rejected the first amendment academic freedom argument, citing this passage from
East Hartford: "'Educational decisions must be made by someone; there is no
reason to create a constitutional preference for the views of individual teachers
over those of their employers."' Id. at 277-78. See also Gilbertson v. McAlister,
383 F. Supp. 1107 (D. Conn. 1974).
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In the same year as East Hartford, the Second Circuit
upheld the authority of the school board from a different
perspective. In Trachtman v. Anker,'6' the court refused to
recognize a constitutional right for student newspaper staffers
to conduct a sex survey of the student body and print the
results in the school newspaper. Drawing in part on the rationale advanced in Tinker,'62 the Second Circuit supported the
regulatory right of school officials, noting that its action in suppressing the sex survey "is not so much a curtailment of any
First Amendment rights; it is principally a measure to protect
the students committed to their care... from peer contacts and
pressures which may result in emotional disturbance ....,103
The concern of the Second Circuit for the welfare of
students and the smooth operation of schools, as evidenced in
the Presidents Council East Hartford,and Trachtman decisions,
suggests that its support for teacher rights of expression in
James and Russo' is unlikely to extend to overt demonstrations of teacher academic freedom in the classroom.
One of the earliest controversies regarding academic freedom emerged in the Fourth Circuit in 1965. A teacher, Ray
Parker, brought suit in district court claiming that his assignment of Aldous Huxley's Brave New World triggered his nonrenewal and that he was denied due process. The district court rejected his arguments. The court noted that insofar as his academic
freedom claim was concerned, "Plaintiff cites no case which supports his First Amendment Claims." ' The Fourth Circuit
upheld the lower court's decision on the due process issue,
61 426 F. Supp. 198 (S.D. N.Y. 1976), rev'd, 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.

denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978).
'
See note 145 supra and accompanying text.
163 563 F.2d at 519.
18 In Russo, a flag salute case discussed, at note 108 supra and accompanying text, the Second Circuit refused to allow infringement of the teacher's First
Amendment right to refuse to lead the class in the pledge; it added the following:
"By our holding today we do not mean to limit the traditionally broad discretion
that has always rested with local school authorities to prescribe curriculum, set
classroom standards, and evaluate conduct of teachers .... " 469 F.2d at 633.
'1 Parker v. Board of Educ., 237 F. Supp. 222, 229 (D.M. 1965). Note that the
first case supportive of teacher classroom academic freedom did not occur until
Keefe v. Geanakos in 1969. See the discussion of Keefe, at note 97 supra and accompanying text.
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avoiding the academic freedom claim. 6 While this circuit has
yet to hear a case directly involving teacher classroom discussion or choice of teaching methodology/materials, the appeals
court did recognize the broad authority of the school board over
teacher classroom behavior in Frison v. Franklin County Board
of Education.6 ' The case involved a teacher demoted for reading
the contents of a student note aloud to the class to discourage
students from passing notes. The note contained some vulgar
terms. The appeals panel noted that "we find no error in the
district court's ruling. The regulations prescribing a teacher's
speech and conduct are necessarily broad; they cannot possibly
mention every specific kind of misconduct." '
The Seventh Circuit has given considerable attention to the
issue of teacher classroom academic freedom. In a 1979 case,
three teachers challenged their discharge from the Cook County
Schools on the grounds that the school had abridged their first
6 9
They had distributed
and fourteenth amendment freedoms."
"Woodstock" literature and poems discussing the joys of marijuana and a free lifestyle. In a 2-to-1 ruling, the appeals court
gave substantial attention to professional opinion regarding the
relevancy of the materials to the teaching assignment, to district curriculum guidelines, and to the age of the students
(eighth graders). The court affirmed the lower court judgment
for the school district. Undoubtedly influential in the outcome,
"' 348 F.2d 464 (4th Cir. 1965) (per curiam), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1030 (1966).
Parker later reinstigated the case with the same arguments but different defendants. The district court decision was again affirmed. 384 F.2d 873 (4th Cir. 1967)
(per curiam).
117596 F.2d 1192 (4th Cir. 1979).
11 Id. at 1194. See the concurring opinion of Circuit Judge Bryan. "Above all,
I deplore the entry of the National courts into a State public school student-discipline incident .... Our dockets cannot afford the time and effort to grind such
petty grist." Id. at 1194-95. See also Cornwall v. State Bd. of Educ., 428 F.2d 471
(4th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970) (school district has right to
provide comprehensive program of family life and sex education), and Moore v.
Gaston County Bd. of Educ., 357 F. Supp. 1037 (W.D.N.C. 1973) (district court
cites Keefe and Mailloux, among other cases, in support of teacher academic
freedom to engage in classroom discussion, but ultimately relies on the Establishment Clause in supporting teacher right to respond to student questions with
answers aproving Darwinism theory, indicating personal agnosticism, and ques-

tioning literal interpretation of the Bible).
Ill Brubaker v. Board of Educ., 502 F.2d 973 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 965 (1975).
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in addition to the age of the students, was the fact that the
teacher involved did not seek an accomodation with school officials when the incident became known, but resorted instead to
litigation. In dissent, Circuit Judge Fairchild maintained that the
"Woodstock" brochure was relevant to educational goals, and
that teachers should have the prerogative of employing its use
in their classes in the absence of specific school policy.
A teacher may be more successful with his students if he is able
to relate to them in philosophy of life, and, conversely, students
may profit by learning something of a teacher's views on general
subjects. Academic freedom entails the exchange of ideas which
promote education in its broadest sense.'
The Seventh Circuit had occasion to affirm its support for
school board authority over teacher classroom behavior in a
1979 case involving a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses. In
Palmer v. Board of Education,7 ' the district court upheld the
dismissal of a probationary kindergarten teacher who refused to
teach and direct the pledge of allegiance and patriotic songs in
class. The district court distinguished Palmer from two decisions in the second circuit, Russo v. Central School District'
and Hanover v. Northrup,' noting that considerable evidence of
dislocation of normal school activities and dissatisfaction of
parents, students, and staff members existed. Further, the
school principal had made a significant effort to accomodate the
teacher's religious views. Assuming that a teacher has a constitutional right not to pledge allegiance to the flag, the court
relied on the Mt. Healthy test to conclude that the school would
have dismissed anyone who refused to follow the curriculum requirements. In affirming the district court's decision, the appeals court reiterated its view that "the First Amendment was
not a teacher license for uncontrollable expression at variance
with established curricular content."'74 The court went on to say
170

502 F.2d at 991-92.

affd, 603 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.
466 F. Supp. 600 (N.D. Ill.),
denied, 444 U.S. 1026 (1980). In a 1976 case, Fern v. Thorp Pub. School, 532 F.2d
1120 (7th Cir. 1976), the appeals court reviewed the dismissal of a teacher for
distributing a sex survey in class. Although the teacher claimed a violation of the
first and fourteenth amendments, the 2-to-1 reversal and remand was based on
improper use of injunctive procedure.
"1 469 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 932 (1973).
325 F. Supp. 170 (D. Conn. 1970).
603 F.2d at 1273.
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that "[t]here is a compelling state interest in the choice and adherence to a suitable curriculum for the benefit of our young
citizens and society. It cannot
be left to individual teachers to
'7 5
teach what they please.'
The Seventh Circuit reiterated this view in a unique 1980
case involving the academic freedom rights of students. The
students in Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp. 8 were
protesting termination of an experimental English curriculum,
including a minicourse entitled "Women in Literature" and the
books used in the course. The teacher who had taught the
course was not offered a new contract when the phase-out occurred. Two students sued, alleging that their "right to know"
and "right to read" had been infringed, that the decisions were
based on the personal tastes of the school board and not on pedagogy, and that the entire episode affected the academic freedom of students and teachers alike. The district court dismissed
the case on the ground that no constitutionally protected right
had been infringed.
Though substantially agreeing with the lower court ruling,
the Seventh Circuit remanded the case to determine if the plaintiffs could amend their complaint "to allege the kind of interference with secondary school academic freedom that has been
found to be cognizable as a constitutional claim."' 177 The appeals
court agreed that students do have some entitlement to a "freedom to hear" in the classroom, but held that the school board
has "a vital and compelling interest" in selecting a suitable curriculum. The court noted the "students' lack of the intellectual
skills necessary for taking.full advantage of the marketplace of
ideas," ' and the interest of the school board in seeing that the
intellectual development of students includes "the encouragement and nurturing of those fundamental social, political, and
moral values that will permit a student to take his place in the
community."'179 The court again strongly endorsed school board
authority. "The Constitution neither disparages the application
of social, political, and moral tastes to secondary school educa,, ld at 1274.
631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 1309.
"'

Id- at 1304.

"7

Id
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tional decisions nor specifies that such criteria are irrelevant or
alien to the legitimate exercise of educational choice."'," Insofar
as teacher academic freedom was concerned, the Seventh Circuit found it "difficult to conceive how a student may assert a
right to have the teacher control the classroom when the
teacher herself does not have such a right."'8
It would appear from Brubaker,Palmer, and Zykan that the
Seventh Circuit is strongly committed to the traditional view
that schools should be orderly places where community values
are inculcated and teachers are required to adhere to the prescribed curriculum.
The Eighth Circuit likewise has supported school board and
administrative authority over teacher classroom academic
freedom. In its first consideration of the issue, the Eighth Circuit was confronted with a case involving a teacher dismissed
for refusing to abide by the principal's directive that she cease
talking about a substitute teacher's slapping of one of the pupils
in the context of student and teacher rights and that she concentrate on teaching economics.' 82 Frances Ahern viewed her continued discussion of the incident as part of her effort to maintain
rapport with her students and as an expression of her constitutional right to choose teaching methodology. In affirming the
district court's rejection of her argument, Chief Judge Matthes
observed that "Ahern was invested by the Constitution with no
right either (1)to persist in a course of teaching behavior which
contravened the valid dictates of her employers, the public
school board, regarding classroom method, or (2) as phrased by
the district court, 'to teach politics in a course of economics.' ,,13
The Eighth Circuit reiterated its support for school board
authority a year later in Birdwell v. Hazelwood School District.8'
This time the court chose to examine the situation within the
context of the Tinker and Pickering decisions. 8 On appeal from
an adverse district court ruling, Birdwell claimed that the-school
Id. at 1306.
Id. at 1307.
Ahern v. Board of Educ., 327 F. Supp. 1391 (D.C. Neb. 1971), aff'd, 456
F.2d 399 (8th Cir. 1972).
456 F.2d at 403-04.
352 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Mo. 1972), aff'd, 491 F.2d 490 (8th Cir. 1974).
" See notes 141-47 supra and accompanying text.
"

181
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district had denied him his constitutionally protected right to
free speech by firing him as the result of his derogatory statements made to mathematics students during a school visit by
ROTC representatives. In essence, he told his students that
they were "4000 strong" and could get the ROTC off campus if
they wanted. The teacher's comments were not only found irrelevant to his teaching assignment but "'infused with the spirit
of violent action' to the degree that the authorities found a situation of potential disruption." 8 '
In the three cases coming before it, the Tenth Circuit also
has endorsed the traditional approach, though with some recognition of a teacher's right of commentary and choice of methodology in the classroom. In the first case, Adams v. Campbell
County School District,87 the appeals court affirmed a lower
court ruling that nonrenewal of appellants' contract did not infringe protected rights. The teachers had sought to show that
the school board took the action to retaliate for their alleged
connection with the publication of an underground newspaper
and the use and discussion of controversial materials in the
classroom and school. The appeals court recognized that teachers do have some freedom in the use of classroom techniques,
"but this does not say that they have an unlimited liberty as to
structure and content of the courses, at least at the secondary
level." 18 8 The court elaborated:
In the case at bar the teaching methods of Adams and
Wiseman may have had educational value as the expert testified, but this is not equivalent to saying they had a constitus 491 F.2d at 493-94. But see the district court decision in Downs v. Conway
School Dist., 328 F. Supp. 338 (E.D. Ark. 1971). An Arkansas teacher whose contract was not renewed because of alleged "insubordination, lack of cooperation,
and teaching second graders to protest" charged that the nonrenewal was a violation of her right of free speech. The conduct objected to by the school involved
her "Think and Do" program for second graders which encouraged pupil expression through drawing and writing. Some pupils drew pictures illustrating matters
that concerned the teacher relating to the health and welfare of the children, such
as inoperative water fountains, an attractive-nuisance incinerator, and poor nutritional planning in the lunchroom. The court held that the teacher was denied
substantive due process regarding freedom of expression and censorship in
teaching. It followed Tinker in reasoning that the censorship implied was contrary to the development in children of a capacity for independent thought.
" 511 F.2d 1242 (10th Cir. 1975).

'

511 F.2d at 1247.

189Id

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1981

51

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 4

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

tional right absolute in character to employ their methods in
preference to more standard or orthodox ones. 89'
Powers v. Mancos School District9 ' involved a teacher who
claimed his nonrenewal was in retaliation for presenting a
lesson to his class concerning the rock opera, Jesus Christ
Superstar. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's
dismissal of the case, noting that there were substantial reasons
for his nonrenewal unrelated to first amendment rights. The
court acknowledged that employment decisions are partly subjective, based on "personal impessions," but declared the
remedy for imperfections lies in the political, not judicial, domain. "Those aggrieved by school board decisions may seek
recourse by the power of the ballot in efforts to effect removal
of those board members who do not share their philosophy."' 9'
In the most recent case, Cary v. Board of Education'9 the
district court came close to recognizing some entitlement of
public high school teachers to academic freedom in selecting
classroom teaching materials. "Effective citizenship in a participatory democracy must not be dependent upon advancement
toward college degrees. Consequently, it would be inappropriate
to conclude that academic freedom is required only in the colleges and universities."'93
But the court did not decide whether the school board or
teachers ought to prevail in the dispute over the teaching of
materials in elective courses. It ruled that while the school
board itself had consented to allow students and teachers the
freedom to explore contemporary literature by allowing the
courses to be taught as electives, the teachers had bargained
away their freedom over classroom instructional materials in
collective negotiations. At issue were ten books out of a list of
1,285 which the school board deleted from the list without explanation.' The parties agreed that the books were not obscene,
that no systematic effort had been made to exclude any particular system of thought or philosophy, and that a "constitu190

391 F. Supp. 322 (D. Col. 1975), aff'd, 539 F.2d 38 (10th Cir. 1976).

19,
539 F.2d at 44.
19 427 F. Supp. 945 (D.C. Col. 1977), aff'd on other grounds, 598 F.2d 535
(10th Cir. 1979).
193 427 F. Supp. at 953.
194Among the books were Anthony Burgess' A Clockwork Orange, William
Blatty's The Exorcist, and Ira Levin's Rosemary's Baby.
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tionally-proper decision maker" could decide the books were appropriate for high school language arts classes.1 95
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, but on the grounds of the inherent authority of the school board to control the curriculum.
However, Judge Logan did recognize some constitutional protection for classroom discussion. "We think teachers do have some
rights to freedom of expression in the classroom, teaching high
school juniors and seniors. They cannot be made simply to read
from a script prepared or approved by the board."1' 9 Since the
board decision did not prohibit mention of the books in class (it
did prohibit such extensive discussion as to countermand the
book ban) but was limited to keeping the books from becoming
part of a class assignment, the board's action was found within
its discretion to determine curricular parameters. Judge Logan
reviewed previous academic freedom cases and noted law
review articles discussing some of the underlying complexities,
but opted not to add additional commentary to the teacher
academic freedom debate. According to the court, the teachers
claimed a right to be free from the "personal predilections of the
board." The court responded that, "[w]e do not see a basis in the
' 97
constitution to grant their wish.'
In his concurrence, Circuit Judge Doyle stated he would
have the school board advance reasons for the exclusion so that
there can be a court review. "Ifthey are excluded because the
Board member disapproves for a subjective reason, I would say
that this is an unlawful and unconstitutional invasion of the
classroom."' 98 It is not clear what he had in mind, for there
seems little difference between "subjective reason" and "personal predilections of the Board," which the court upheld.
V.

A.

IMPLICATIONS

For Teachers

Federal court involvement in the last decade with teacher
academic freedom suggests that while broad control of the state
"9

427 F. Supp. at 947-48.

598 F.2d at 543.
, Id at 544. Note the similarity of the Seventh Circuit's conclusion in Zykan
v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980). See also note
176-81 supra and accompanying text.
18 Id2
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and school district over curriculum and related classroom activity
continues to garner substantial recognition, the claims of upper
level public school teachers to some degree of academic freedom
in the classroom have received growing judicial attention. To
date, four circuits have supported some facet of teacher
classroom academic freedom.'99 Even in a few of the circuits
which continue to accord states and school boards plenary curriculum control, classroom academic freedom for teachers below
the collegiate level has not been completely ignored. Thus, the
Tenth Circuit recognized in Cary v. Board of Education"' that
teachers have some degree of freedom in the use of classroom
techniques."'
It is important for teachers to understand, however, that
even in those circuits supportive of classroom academic freedom
there remains considerable attachment to broad state and school
board curriculum control. Thus, the First Circuit backed away
from the district court's guidelines in Mailloux v. Kiley, one of
the key teacher classroom academic freedom precedents. That
court opted for -a case-by-case balancing approach to ascertain
"whether the legitimate interests of the authorities are demonstrably sufficient to circumscribe a teacher's speech.'1 2
Given the variations among the circuits it is important for
teachers, teacher professional organizations, and those involved
in teacher education to understand the law as it applies to them.
This requires continuous monitoring of the case law, since this
area of education law appears to be in transition.
Teachers should use caution in asserting a claim to engage
in classroom discussion or choose teaching methodology. In addition to knowing the law in their locale, teachers should endeavor
to ascertain what school policy is with respect to curriculum
practices and the role of the teacher. Since the quality of the
employer-employee relationship has recently caught the attenSee notes 97-140 supra and accompanying text.
0 598 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1979).
=' Also note the views of Circuit Judges Oakes and Smith in East Hartford
Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 405 F. Supp. 94 (D. Conn. 1975), aff'd en banc, 562
F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1977). See note 157 supra and accompanying text.
...448 F.2d 1242, 1243 (lst Cir. 1971) (per curiam). See the discussion of
Maijoux, at notes 100-106 supra and accompanying text.
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tion of courts," 3 teachers should be careful not to exericse rights
of expression within the school in such a way as to seriously
erode their ability to work with school administrators and colleagues.
B.

For Administrators

The implications of the developing teacher classroom academic freedom are important for administrators. To consider
these return to the Fifth Circuit's Kingsville ruling, with which
the article began.2"4 In light of the court's decision, the
Kingsville administrators failed in two important respects.
First, they failed to order Cooper to cease using the teaching
technique. Their orders "not to discuss Blacks in American
2 ° and not to discuss anything controversial in the
history""
classroom were thus doomed from the start. Cooper could not
avoid controversy as long as the simulation technique continued.
Nor could she be found insubordinate in using an unauthorized
teaching method. Second, administrators recommended that her
term contract be renewed. This precluded the assertion that she
was an ineffective teacher. The board was left with only one
reason for its decision of nonrenewal, a reason that turned out
to be unconstitutional.
What could the administrators have done differently to win
the case? Suppose they had sent the teacher a memo containing
the same directives they expressed orally. In some circuits the
existing case law suggests that may have been sufficient.0
Clearly, however, a memo would not change the Kingsville decision, because the memo would have been directed toward discussion, which the Fifth Circuit supported as a legitimate
academic right. Even if the administrators had documented continued controversy in and out of the classroom, the outcome
probably would have remained the same. The Fifth Circuit
noted that even if substantial disruption were to occur, the
" See the discussion of Mt Healthy and its progeny, note 57 supraand accompanying text.
See notes 1-5 supra and accompanying text.
611 F.2d at 1111.
= Note the stance of the Fourth Circuit in Frison v. Franklin County Bd. of
Educ., 596 F.2d 1192 (4th Cir. 1979), and the Eighth Circuit in Ahern v. Board of
Educ., 327 F. Supp. 1391 (D. Neb. 1971), affd, 456 F.2d 399 (8th Cir. 1972).
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teacher could not be dismissed. What must be shown is that the
disruption "overbalances the teacher's usefulness as an instructor." 07 A series of reports documenting continued controversy
would not pass this test.
Suppose the administrators had recommended that Cooper's
contract not be renewed. Since the school district had not
adopted the Texas Continuing Contract Law," 8 but relied on
term contracts, the district would not have had to justify nonrenewal, even if requested. 9 Should the teacher go to court, however, the school district, under Mt. Healthy,21 would again be
left without sufficient reasons unrelated to the classroom discussion to support the nonrenewal.
Suppose the administrators had ordered Cooper to cease using the simulation technique in the classroom and had put the
demand in writing. Assuming she refused to do so and was then
dismissed following appropriate notice and a hearing, this would
satisfy those courts requiring some specific policy statement
against which teacher behavior can be measured. 11 On the other
hand, if the court were to look behind the directive, the motive
for its promulgation may undermine its validity. Courts, such as
the Fifth Circuit, which have recognized a teacher's constitutional right to engage in classroom discussion may be unwilling
to accept a school directive, if it can be shown that its primary
purpose is to curtail that right of classroom discussion. 12
611 F.2d at 1113 n.4.
TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. vol. 1 §§ 13.101 et. seq. (Vernon 1972).
In Dennis v. S & S Consolidated School Dist., 577 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1978),
the court stated that, "under our holding, of course, the State remains free to terminate or decline to rehire a non-tenured employee for no reason at all or for
stigmatizing, even false reasons privately stated." Id. at 343. In Dennis, the
school had voluntarily given reasons, one member telling the teacher his renewal
occurred because he had a "drinking problem," thus creating a cause of action for
infringement of a fourteenth amendment liberty interest.
210
429 U.S. 274 (1977).
As it was, the district court in Kingsville had requested the school district to
offer new evidence, but the district declined to do so, standing on its claim that
the nonrenewal was justified by the complaints about Cooper's classroom project.

See Judge Johnson's comments in Parducci,316 F. Supp. 352, discussed at
notes 119-122 supra and accompanying text, and Judge Parker's comments in
2"

Dean v. Timpson Independent School Dist., 486 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Tex. 1979),

discussed at notes 132-36 supra and accompanying text.
'12
See Judge Bue's comment in Sterzing v. Ft. Bend Independent School
Dist., 376 F. Supp. 657 (S.D. Tex. 1972), vacated as to remedy and remanded, 496
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If the Kingsville school district had had a policy statement
regulating the use of simulation techniques in the classroom,
had used it to require Cooper to cease using the Sunshine project, but not to cease class discussion of controversialtopics and
she had refused, the case would probably have come out differently.213 But it appears that, short of clear documentation
showing that Cooper's classroom discussion had generated so
much controversy as to overbalance her effectiveness as an instructor, there was no way that the school administrators could
have legally sought her dismissal or sustained a nonrenewal
challenge under the circumstances of the case.
The implications for school personnel decision making,
which has often been notoriously lax,214 are clear. In circuits
where some degree of teacher classroom academic freedom has
been recognized school authorities must devote more attention
to developing school curriculum policies in light of legal
developments so that teachers can know ahead of time how
much discretion they have to engage in classroom discussion and
F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam), that, "[Ilt would be ill-advised to presume that
a teacher would be limited in essence, to a single textbook in teaching a course today in civics and social studies." 376 F. Supp. at 661. See also the district court's
treatment of this issue in Minarcini v. Strongsville School Dist., 384 F. Supp. 698
(N.D. Ohio 1974), affd in part, 541 F.2d 577 (1976). But see the Seventh Circuit's
ruling in Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, discussed at
notes 176-81 supra and accompanying text.
213 Returning to the question which triggered this research, i.e., whether
under the Texas free entetprise law the state can prevent teachers from using
other than the state-prescribed materials and instructional techniques (see note 5
supra), since Kingsville does not reach this issue and Dean did not involve a
specific school policy statement, it appears that the state can legally limit teacher
academic freedom in this way. The case law, however, clearly indicates that the
state cannot proscribe teacher discussion of free enterprise-related issues. See
note 6 supra.Thus, to the extent the statute limits teaching to the "essentials and
benefits of the free enterprise system," it may be overly restrictive.
2" Personnel evaluation, as currently practiced in most schools by administrators, has all too often followed the pattern revealed by Judge Bue in Sterzing.
It seems strange, indeed, to this Court that the principal had never
visited the classroom of Mr. Sterzing and was wholly unfamiliar with
his teaching methods. Yet it is this pattern of unfamiliarity which seems
to permeate the so-called chain of command, culminating with the
board, which then proceeded to act and reach decisions without the
benefit of firsthand knowledge as to what was going on in Mr.
Sterzing's classroom.
376 F. Supp. at 661, discussed at note 124 supra.
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to choose classroom materials and teaching methodology. 15
Classroom teaching must be more carefully and consistently
monitored, and deficiencies must be documented. Requests that
teachers cease using a particular technique or material in light
of school policy pronouncements must be made in writing. Even
though, in many jurisdictions nonrenewals need not be accompanied by a recitation of the reasons for the actions,21 administrators should be prepared to reveal them should a disgruntled
employee pursue the matter in court, alleging that nonrenewal
was in retaliation for the exercise of protected liberty rights.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This article has reviewed recent developments in education
law related to teacher classroom academic freedom in the public
schools and the implications for both teachers and administrators. A brief look at the difficult questions underlying the issue,
questions with which the courts, the ultimate deciders of "what
the law is," must contend, concludes this article.
First, are public school students entitled to a "right to
know/hear" in the classroom at any age? How much credibility
should be accorded the findings of researchers about student intellectual and emotional maturity?217 Should the mixed motives
for keeping young people in school through late adolescence
have any influence on the character of the learning environment? 18
Second, what significance should be accorded the fact that,
through the media, peer conduct, and general community life,
students are exposed to all types of messages which many
school board members may consider objectionable? Should the
inconsistency doctrine be used as a criterion in determining the
legality of school curriculum control?" 9 If not, will the school enIn Cary v. Board of Educ., Judge Logan noted in his review of the cases
upholding teacher claims of classroom academic freedom infringement that most
"seemed to be situations where school authorities acted in the absence of a
general policy, after the fact, and had little to charge against the teacher other
than the assignment with which they were unhappy." 598 F.2d 535, 541.
215

216 See Dennis v. S & S Consolidated School Dist., 577 F.2d 338, discussed,
note 209 supra and accompanying text.
217See note 33 supra and accompanying text in connection with this issue.
218

Id

219

See Keefe v. Geunakos, 305 F. Supp. 1091, discussed, at notes 34-37 supra

and accompanying text.
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vironment become so sterile and "unreal" to students that disenchantment will increase, causing more students to drop out mentally and/or physically?
Third, do public school teachers have, by virtue of their professional training and experience, entitlement to the same
degree of classroom academic freedom enjoyed by their collegiate counterparts?22
Fourth, how much relevance should be given to the presence
of clearly worded and promulgated school policy statements
regarding teacher classroom academic freedom? Should courts
look behind them to assess their impact on teacher expression
rights? Or should courts defer to the wishes of the school board
as a political body?"
Compare the assertions of the National Education Association, discussed,
at note 74 supra and accompanying text, with the views of the district court in
Mailloux, discussed at note 32 supra and accompanying text.
1 One commentator argues that because the nature of first amendment
rights of students and teachers is so difficult to define in the classroom context,
the judiciary is best off deferring to the elected school board.
The 'free speech' analysis asserts the primacy of certain results- 'the
diversity of views on which a democracy thrives'-over the democratic
process itself. Those results may be important-they are, in my view.
But they are not necessarily more legitimate than the process of governance wherein elected official supervise texts and curricula in the
schools just as they do all the other functions of representative government. The issues raised in text and curricular disputes go to the heart
of the role of American education. It is for just that reason that they ordinarily should be resolved in the traditional forums of educational
politics and governance.
Orleans, What Johnny Can't Rea& 'FirstAmendment Rights' in the Classroom,
10 J. LAW AND EDUC. 1, 12 (1981) (emphasis in original).
The problem with Orleans' thesis is that it reads the first amendment out of
the classroom altogether at the pre-collegiate and quite possibly at the postsecondary level as well, id. at 3 n.6., thus ignoring the academic freedom case law
which has already developed. More fundamentally, it seems clear that the role of
government in education is not the same as in other activities, such as road-building, for education uniquely involves the communication of ideas and the formulation of beliefs. It thus can be argued that in no other area are first amendment
freedoms more recognizable, even though their demarcations are not easily
discerned. It should not be forgotten that school attendance is compulsory, a factor which augers for more exposure to ideas, not less, in an open society where
minority interests are safeguarded in the face of majoritarian control.
For a contrasting viewpoint, see Aarons, The Separation of School and
State: Pierce Reconsidered, 46 HARV. EDUC. REv. 76, 100 (1976).
The state provides a 'free' public education to all children of appropriate age and qualifications through its system of public schools.
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Ultimately, judges cannot avoid facing questions of value
about the purpose of education. Is the purpose of public education, in the words of the district court in Pico v. Board of Education, "indoctrinative, to transmit basic values of the
community,"22' or, in the words of Justice Douglas, is it to
educate "our youth to shed the prejudices of the past, to explore
all forms of thought, and to find solutions to our world's problems?"' If the answer depends in part on the age and level of
schooling, where should the lines be drawn, and by whom? The
questions are profound, and to the extent constitutional interests are wrapped up in the answers, it is an evasion of judicial
responsibility not to confront them.

But the state may not condition the provision of this education-whether it be a right or a privilege-upon the sacrifice by
parents of their First Amendment rights. Yet this is precisely the effect
of a school system that requires a child to attend a school controlled by
a majority of the public in order to receive a 'free' education. That
public school will represent and attempt to inculcate values that a particular family may find abhorrent to its own basic beliefs and way of
life. The family is then faced with the choice of (1) abandoning its beliefs
in order to gain the benefit of a state-subsidized education, or (2)
forfeiting the proffered government benefit in order to preserve the
family belief structure from government inference.
See also Comment, Challenging Ideological Exclusion of Curriculum Material
Rights of Students and Parents,14 HARV. CIv. RIGHTS L. REV. 485 (1979), and Niccolai, The Right to Read and School Library Censorship, 10 J. L. AND EDUC. 23
(1981). Niccolai discusses the standards to be used in deciding the constitutionality
of library book removal and selection. Whether involving book removal or selection, Niccolai maintains that workable standards can be developed to preclude
school officials from making decisions solely on the basis of their own personal
tastes and to guide judges in applying the first amendment.
The focus on rights definitions and decision making standards, while important, tends to obfuscate the underlying issues: what should be the purpose of
schooling in a democratic society and what role should the judiciary play in
resolving first amendment disputes within the educational setting?
474 F. Supp. 387, 396 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd and rem'd, 638 F.2d 404 (2d
Cir. 1980) cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3265 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1981).
Presidents Council v. Community School Bd., 409 U.S. 998, 998-99 (1972)
(Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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